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ARTICLES
Workers’ Rights as Natural
Human Rights
ANNE MARIE LOFASO*
We live in an increasingly polarized world: one summed
up by President Clinton, “we’re all in this together;” the
other summed up by then-presidential candidate Trump, “I
alone can fix it.” These world views have implications for
workers and how the future workplace is ordered. In this
Article, I explore the idea that a natural human rights approach to workplace regulations will tend to favor the we’reall-in-this-together view, whereas the Lochnerian or neoliberal view tends to favor an individualistic world view.
The Article’s six-step analytical approach starts with a
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historical analysis of labor law jurisprudence, concluding
that U.S. labor laws must be filtered through a law-and-economic lens of U.S.-styled capitalism to predict the outcomes
of legal disputes and to expose human rights infirmities inherent to that approach. In step two, I explore T.H. Marshall’s account of citizenship, concluding that Marshall’s
rights-based rubric is too limited to fully explain workers’
rights, which tend to cut across the full gamut of human
rights. In step three, I expand upon Marshall’s work to build
a framework for evaluating workplace laws based on the
worker as a citizen of the labor force who has human rights.
I do this using two methodologies: (1) comparative legal
analysis between U.S. law and international human rights
standards; and (2) jurisprudential analysis of fundamental
values within a rights-based framework. In step four, I modify John Rawls’s famous thought experiment to include a veil
of empathy. In that modified experiment, I conclude that participants in the original position behind a veil of empathy
would generate values underlying human rights, namely autonomy (to become part author of one’s work life) and dignity (to be treated as a person always as an end and never
merely as a means). In step five, I apply this human rights
approach to show that workers’ and employers’ interests
conflict at the interests-level and, more fundamentally, at the
values-level. I conclude that these conflicts are primarily
over the distribution of that which labor and capital create.
This distributional question is fundamental a question of
moral and political justice, which will and does have real
political consequences. In step six, I set forth a path along
which this research project should explore.
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A. Two Visions of America............................................ 569
B. Modern Workplace Fragmentation Has Resulted in a
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Two Visions of America
There are two visions of America a half century from
now. One is of a society more divided between the
haves and the have-nots, a country in which the rich
live in gated communities, send their children to expensive schools, and have access to first-rate medical
care. Meanwhile, the rest live in a world marked by
insecurity, at best mediocre education, and in effect
rationed health care―they hope and pray they don’t
get seriously sick. At the bottom are millions of
young people alienated and without hope. I have seen
that picture in many developing countries; economists have given it a name, a dual economy, two societies living side by side, but hardly knowing each
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other, hardly imagining what life is like for the other.
Whether we will fall to the depths of some countries,
where the gates grow higher and the societies split
farther and farther apart, I do not know. It is, however, the nightmare towards which we are slowly
marching.1
The capacity for Americans to live good lives necessarily depends on their capacity to provide for themselves and their families.
The good life entails meaningful access to education, health care,
and good jobs in a secure environment. The vast majority of Americans identify as middle class, but nearly all of us are working class,
in the sense that we must work in jobs to meet our basic needs. To
disrupt the path toward cementing these two visions of the American
future, this Article focuses on labor rights in helping to create a context (together with other socioeconomic rights such as security, education, and health care access) that allows for self-actualization,
thereby leading the way toward greater economic equality.
One challenge to disrupting this path is neoliberal rhetoric. As
one neoliberal standard bearer, U.S. Representative Paul Ryan, has
said, “[A] renewed commitment to limited government will unshackle our economy and create millions of new jobs and opportunities for all people, of every background, to succeed and prosper.
Under this approach, the spirit of initiative —not political clout—
determines who succeeds.”2 Mitt Romney similarly declared: “Job
and income growth can only come from a growing, successful private sector . . . .A pro-job, pro-prosperity government works to create the conditions that enable businesses of all sizes to grow and
thrive.”3 While neoliberalism purports to augment liberty for all by
limiting government interference in business affairs, as this Article
1

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED
SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 289 (2012).
2
CNN, CNN Live Event/Special: Republicans Respond to President Obama,
TRANSCRIPTS (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
1101/25/se.03.html. See also Remarks to the Manhattan Institute in New York
City, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1367–68 (Nov. 13, 2008).
3
Mitt Romney, Grow Jobs and Shrink Government, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug.
18, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2010/08/18/grow_jobs_and_shrink_government/?camp=localsearch:on:twit
:rtbutton.
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shows, free market policies coerce workers and restrict their liberty.
For example, despite increasing evidence that black lung disease has
been worsening, the coal industry blocked effective coal-dust regulations until recently.4 Not only did the unregulated market stifle the
liberty of coal miners who suffered from this heinous disease, it succeeded in snuffing out their lives.5
B. Modern Workplace Fragmentation Has Resulted in a No-DutyHolder Problem
The modern workplace has become increasingly fractured.6 This
fragmentation has been occurring on many levels. On one level, the
workplace has splintered geographically.7 Twentieth-century outsourcing8 of U.S. jobs began in the 1970s and 1980s in two ways.
First, companies began to outsource non-core jobs that could be
done with the help of computers, such as company payroll.9 Shortly
thereafter, jobs such as billing, accounting, and word processing,
which could also be executed with the help of computers, were also
outsourced.10 Second, companies began to outsource manufacturing
jobs, typically consumer electronic products, to geographic areas
with both expertise and lower labor costs.11 By the 1990s, the U.S.
witnessed offshore outsourcing, the outsourcing of jobs to foreign
countries.12 As one scholar noted, however, offshore outsourcing
4

See Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, 79 Fed.
Reg. 24,814 (May 1, 2014). See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, What We Owe Our
Coal Miners, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 90–91, 94–95, 101 (2011).
5
See id. at 89–95.
6
Fracturing is a different, albeit related, problem to subcontracting, which
is beyond the scope of this paper.
7
This account does not include the movement of manufacturing from the
northern to the southern states. This movement of capital complicates the picture
but is beyond the scope of this paper.
8
By outsourcing, I mean giving jobs to those who are not company employees.
9
See generally Daniel W. Drezner, The Outsourcing Bogeyman, 83
FOREIGN AFF. 22, 24 (2004).
10
See id. at 24–25.
11
See Rob Handfield, A Brief History of Outsourcing, N.C. STATE UNIV.:
SUPPLY CHAIN RES. COOP. (June 1, 2006), https://scm.ncsu.edu/scm-articles/article/a-brief-history-of-outsourcing.
12
For example, American Express established “back-office operations in India” in the early 1990s. See Drezner, supra note 9, at 25.
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raised few concerns (except possibly among those personally affected) because more jobs were created in the U.S. (especially in the
high-end service sector) than were lost to foreign countries.13 He
added, those jobs that
will migrate offshore are predominantly those
that . . . requir[e] low skill since process and repeatability are key underpinnings of the work. Innovation
and deep business expertise will continue to be delivered predominantly on shore.” Not coincidentally,
these are also the tasks that generate high wages and
large profits and drive the U.S. economy.14
On another level, the workplace has splintered into the physical
and digital spheres. When Ronald Reagan was president, there was
literally one type of workplace – the physical space. Whether a factory floor, an office, a classroom, or the field, the workplace consisted entirely of physical space. Today, there are all types of physical and virtual work spaces beyond the factory floor or the office
building. Now there are telecommunication centers, alternative office spaces where employees can work to cut down on communicating costs. There are also home offices, which are also used to cut
down on commuting costs or to allow greater work-hour flexibility
often desired to better balance work-family interests. And there are
fully portable spaces that reside inside our portable computers—our
laptops, electronic notebooks, iPads, smart phones, and other completely digitized work spaces.
On a third level, the workplace has splintered in an ontological
sense. Employers categorize or misclassify workers as employees or
13

See id. at 23, 25. This is an application of what free-trade proponents call
comparative advantage, whereby trade occurs because each economic actor (in
this case, each country) has a comparative advantage in producing a good or service more efficiently or less expensively than other economic actors. See, e.g., F.
W. Taussig, Wages and Prices in Relation to International Trade, 20 Q. J. ECON.
497, 500 (1906). The originator of this theory is David Ricardo. See DAVID
RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 108 (John
B. Bell, 2d American ed. 1830) (1817). That theory was modified by Eli
Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin resulting in the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. See
BERTIL OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 316–17 (1933).
14
Drezner, supra note 9, at 26 (quoting an International Data Corporation
analysis).
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independent contractors by manipulating legal rules.15 For example,
an employer may classify a worker as an independent contractor to
minimize its tax liability or to circumvent its legal duties.16
Workplace fragmentation means that many workers are no
longer tied to a particular employer because of their status as virtual
employees in a digital world or as independent contractors. Many
workers have lost their statutory and other legal protections in the
workplace simply because they do not fit the regulatory or common
law definition of employee. In effect, there is no employer on which
to place a legal duty. A human rights approach to workers’ rights
could remedy this problem by ensuring that workers’ rights no
longer attach to workers solely by imposing duties strictly on employers.
C. A Progressive World View Could Categorize Workers’ Rights
as Natural Human Rights and Would Serve Several Worker
Interests
The purpose of this Article is to put forth the progressive view
that workers’ rights are natural human rights. By natural, I mean to
suggest that these rights are grounded in particular moral values—
autonomy and dignity—and in the diminishment of human coercion.
As well as remedying the no-duty-holder problem identified above,
there are at least five additional reasons why it is important to
demonstrate that workers’ rights are human rights. First, articulating
workers’ rights as human rights expresses their fundamental importance. For many, workers’ rights are merely positive rights17 that
must be balanced against employers’ managerial and property interests. In capitalist states such as the U.S., the employer’s interests are
often viewed as more significant.18 Were a capitalist country like the
15

See DEP’T FOR PROF’L EMPS. AFL-CIO, Misclassification of Employees as
Independent Contractors (2016), http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/Misclassification-of-Employees-2016.pdf.
16
See id.
17
By positive rights, I mean rights granted by the state (e.g., statutes, regulations) as opposed to natural rights. I do not mean positive human rights, which
would oblige the state to take action, as opposed to negative human rights, which
would oblige the state to refrain from taking action.
18
See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 533–35 (1992) (holding that employer’s property right to exclude trespasses always outweighs employees’ Section 7 rights to receive information about unionization except where
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U.S. to accept that workers’ rights were human rights, those rights
would be viewed as weightier, and balances in favor of employer
interests would be harder to justify. Second, raising the status of
workers’ rights to human rights places obligations on the state to
respect, protect, and perhaps even actualize the fullness of those
rights. Third, were workers’ rights treated as human rights, additional avenues of recourse would open. Trade unions have been the
traditional institution for promoting the workers’ cause.19 By labeling workers’ rights as human rights, transgression of those rights
may come under the mandate of certain nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). At the very least, transgression would garner more
attention from NGOs and the media. Fourth, if workers’ rights were
treated as human rights, the principle against retrogressive measures
would apply.20 This means that once the state granted rights to employees, it could not diminish those rights without proper justification. Fifth, a theory of workers’ rights as human rights provides an
alternative model to the economic model for describing work law
and workplaces.21 Economic and human rights models often clash
at a values level. The human rights model makes these conflicts
clear and, to some extent, resolvable.
D. The Law and Economics Model for Work Law Serves as A
Historical Foil for the Human Rights Model
Part II puts forth the law and economics model for work law
within its historical context. There, I describe and deconstruct the
values underlying U.S. Supreme Court cases decided during the
Lochner era. Named for the 1905 Supreme Court case, Lochner v.

there are no alternative means of communication); N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (holding that employer’s property rights may also
yield in cases where the employer is discriminating against the union).
19
See generally G. William Domhoff, The Rise and Fall of Labor Unions In
The U.S. (Feb. 2013), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/history_of_
labor_unions.html.
20
See generally UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM’R, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: HANDBOOK FOR
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 28 (2005), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training12en.pdf.
21
See infra Part II.
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New York,22 the Lochner era describes a series of cases decided between 1897 and 1937 in which the Supreme Court struck down state
legislation regulating business on grounds that such legislation unconstitutionally interfered with the business’s liberty interests.23 The
New Deal partially disrupts this paradigm, insofar as the Supreme
Court began to find constitutionally permissible statutes regulating
businesses, such as the National Labor Relations Act24 and the Fair
Labor Standards Act.25 But almost from the very start, the Court,
Congress, and even executive agencies created to enforce these acts
began to chip away at their efficacy in favor of business interests.26
Lochner’s resurrection in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries makes a human rights account of workers’ rights important
in counteracting the dehumanization of workers as factors of production and whose value to society is measured instrumentally. Policy-makers need to draw upon alternative models of thinking in
making rules that better society.
E. The Human Rights Model Refocuses Our Thinking about
Workers as Citizens Who Possess Natural Human Rights Rather
Than as Factors of Production
In Part III, I introduce the thinking of British sociologist,
Thomas Humphrey Marshall, who endorsed the idea of full citizenship.27 Full citizenship, as adapted here, is an account of labor law
where the worker is entitled to the full gamut of rights regardless of
his or her legal status (e.g., statutory employee, independent contractor, migrant worker, undocumented worker) and thus helps combat the no-duty-holder problem.28 Using Marshall’s framework to
explain that full citizens possess political, civil, and social rights, I
explain that workers’ rights29 do not fit neatly into Marshall’s rubric
22

Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See, e.g., id. at 64.
24
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–57 (2012).
25
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012).
26
See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of
Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 201–02 (2010) [hereinafter The Persistence of
Union].
27
See infra Part III.A.
28
Id.
29
For purposes of this paper, I refer to collective bargaining and the procedural rights typically found in the National Labor Relations Act and other labor
23
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not only because they are socio-economic rights (which Marshall
had not contemplated) but also because they cut across these and
other categories.
Building on Marshall’s citizenship model, Part IV presents a
framework for evaluating workplace laws based on the worker as a
citizen of the labor force who has human rights. This framework
starts by deconstructing the terms “human” and “rights.” Drawing
primarily on the theories of Immanual Kant, Joseph Raz, and others,
I conclude that workers’ rights must be grounded in at least two values—autonomy and dignity—and that such rights must be as autonomous as possible from employer coercion.
Part V introduces the work of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice.30
I show that Rawls’ original position, applied to the workplace,
brings us close to generating a set of natural rights grounded in
moral values. I argue that we can get even closer by tweaking Rawls
so that the original position is filled with individuals who are not
only behind a veil of ignorance—insofar as they don’t know their
particular circumstances—but also have the capacity to feel what
every member of society feels given any policy decision. In this position, individuals would agree on two values to ground workplace
rules—autonomy and dignity—and would take steps to minimize
workplace coercion.
F. Refocusing Our Attention on Workers as People Clarifies the
Conflict Between Employers’ and Workers’ Interests Over How the
Wealth They Create Should Be Distributed
In Part VI, I apply the thinking used in Parts IV and V to the
workplace to show that employers’ and employees’ interests conflict
at the foundational level. This conflict results in gridlock between
those who believe that promoting employers’ interests will result in
a more liberated, and therefore better, society and those who believe
that promoting workers’ interests will create a more just, and therefore better, society. I show that the point of greatest conflict is not
on the financial well-being of the firm (in which both labor and management/owners have an interest) but on how the wealth created by
statutes as labor rights; substantive rights for workers as the floor of rights; I reserve the general term workers’ rights to include all rights that workers might
enjoy including the basic labor and substantive work rights.
30
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
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labor and capital working together should be distributed. In Part VII,
I share some concluding thoughts.
II. THE U.S. LAW AND ECONOMICS MODEL: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
A. During the Lochner Era, the Court Grants Constitutional
Protection to a Business Entity’s Right To Discharge its Workers
In the nineteenth century, U.S. workers fought for labor rights
by engaging in economic pressure, where laborers banded together
for mutual aid or protection.31 These workers—whether formally or
informally organized into unions—bargained collectively for better
wages and working conditions or conducted strikes, under the supposition that there was strength in numbers.32 Where the federal or
state government did act to grant workers’ rights, businesses reacted
quickly, moving courts to strike down such laws and regulations as
unlawful interference with their rights to contract freely with workers.33 Labor law thinkers have also long noticed the tension between
the values underlying a free market economy, which in particular
has valued the property rights of those individuals who own capital,
and those values underlying workers’ rights, whether collective or
individual in nature.34 These arguments and judicial decisions were
based on emerging economic theories underlying laissez-faire capitalism. These theories soon established the dominant legal paradigm
in early twentieth-century jurisprudence during what is now called
the Lochner era.35
Nowhere is this free market legal paradigm better illustrated in
the labor context than in Coppage v. Kansas,36 where, in the context
31

See Domhoff, supra note 19.
The history of judicial repression of early unions is beyond the scope of
this paper. For more information, see The Persistence of Union, supra note 26, at
200, 206.
33
See, e.g., Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905).
34
See infra Part II.B.
35
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57–58 (striking down as unconstitutional New
York state law prohibiting bakers’ from working more than 60 hours per week on
the rationale that the state statute unlawfully interfered with the bakers’ freedom
to contract to work more hours).
36
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 19 (1915).
32
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of reaffirming an employer’s right to terminate the employment relationship because of an employee’s union membership, the Court
wrote:
[W]herever the right of private property exists, there
must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it
naturally happens that parties negotiating about a
contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances. This applies to all contracts, and not merely
to that between employer and employ[ee]. Indeed a
little reflection will show that wherever the right of
private property and the right of free contract co-exist, each party when contracting is inevitably more or
less influenced by the question whether he has much
property, or little, or none; for the contract is made to
the very end that each may gain something that he
needs or desires more urgently than that which he
proposes to give in exchange. And, since it is selfevident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others,
it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold
freedom of contract and the right of private property
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights. But the Fourteenth
Amendment, in declaring that a State shall not ‘deprive any person of . . . liberty, or property without
due process of law,’ gives to each of these an equal
sanction; it recognizes ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ as coexistent human rights, and debars the States from any
unwarranted interference with either.
And since a State may not strike them down directly,
it is clear that it may not do so indirectly, as by declaring in effect that the public good requires the removal of those inequalities that are but the normal
and inevitable result of their exercise, and then invoking the police power in order to remove the inequalities, without other object in view. The police
power is broad, and not easily defined, but it cannot
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be given the wide scope that is here asserted for it,
without in effect nullifying the constitutional guaranty.37
Here, the Court acknowledges the inequities inevitable in a free
market system grounded in property and contract rights.38 On
grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment grants cognizable property
and liberty rights, with which the state may not interfere even in the
name of removing these unfortunate inequities, the Court upholds
the employer’s right to force employees to sign a yellow-dog contract (agreement to renounce union membership as a condition of
employment) on threat of termination.39 Accordingly, in Coppage v.
Kansas, the Court resolved in the employer’s favor the tension between the worker’s interest in banding together for mutual aid or
protection in the form of union membership and the employer’s interest in running its business free from union interference, that is,
the interference of workers’ collective voice.40
Notice the following three facets of the Court’s resolution of the
tension inherent in the employee-employer relationship. First, the
Court reifies the business entity into a person.41 The facts of Coppage—in which the state convicted supervisor Coppage for discharging employee Hedges when Hedges refused to sign a yellowdog contract with employer St. Louis & San Francisco Railway
Company disavowing his union membership—allowed the Court to
personify the business entity.42 The rationale for reversing Coppage’s conviction had nothing to do with his conviction being unjust
(i.e., he didn’t do it) or procedurally flawed. Instead the Court found
the criminal law itself unconstitutional based on the following argument typical of the Lochner era:43 (1) business entities and their employees have a cognizable liberty interest to freely contract with one
37

Id. at 17–18.
See id.
39
See id. at 25–26.
40
Id. at 26. See, e.g., Alan Bogg & Tonia Novitz, The Purposes and Techniques of Voice: Prospects for Continuity and Change, in VOICES AT WORK:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 4, 13–14, 16 (Alan Bogg
& Tonia Novitz eds. 2014).
41
See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 8–13.
42
See id. at 7.
43
See id. at 25–26; see also Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905).
38
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another; (2) inequality between or among parties is natural and
based on property rights; (3) liberty and property rights are constitutional equals and, therefore, the law cannot favor one over the
other; and (4) at-will employment actualizes this mutual liberty between the parties without interfering with the parties’ property
rights.44
Second, personifying the business entity permits the Court to
treat the business or employer as an individual who possesses liberty
and property rights. Although the Court also views workers as individuals who possess these rights, it misses the point that these workers have no property (outside their own labor power) and therefore
no property rights. For that reason, they cannot use their liberty to
contract in any meaningful way without strengthening their bargaining position in some other manner. For nearly 200 years, workers
have strengthened their bargaining position by banding together to
aggregate their one possession—their labor power.45 The collective
thereby enhances individual power in much the same way that property enhances the employer’s power. In stark contrast to the way
businesses are personified, the Court treats the workers’ interest in
concerted activity as a non-personal, collective interest in union
membership.46 The business is a person who has the capacity to hold
rights; the union remains an entity devoid of capacity—one which
cannot hold rights.47 The Court’s analysis ironically grants human
rights to a state-created entity and removes the basic human right—
the right to associate—from live humans. In effect, the Court depersonifies the individual. Moreover, by arrogating the employer’s
interest in discharging an employee to the level of a cognizable liberty and property right—indeed, a human right, the Court constitutionally protects, that is, forbids states from interfering with that
right, absent a compelling justification.48 The Court did not need to
worry about the effect such protection might have had on the union
because, at least in the view of some, a union was considered a corrupt institution, in the way we might today think of organized crime
or monopolistic businesses.
44
45
46
47
48

See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 12–13, 17–18, 23–26.
See Domhoff, supra note 19.
See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 19–20.
Id.
Id. at 16, 25–26.
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Relatedly, the Court gave no thought to the fact that a union is
actually a collection of human beings who gather together for the
legitimate purpose of augmenting their own individual interests in
survival, autonomy, dignity, and personal actualization. Accordingly, no thought was given to the collective interest of workers’ in
augmenting their own liberty to participate in workplace decisions
that affect their well-being or even to the idea that the employer’s
actions themselves might be interfering with the employee’s freedom to associate with other members of the working class. In effect,
the Court chose (probably subconsciously) the employer’s autonomy interest to engage in unilateral decision-making in the workplace over the employee’s autonomy interest to engage in decisions
affecting his or her work life.49 Whether consciously or subconsciously, the effect was the same—collectivized capital (a state fabrication) was branded as natural, while collectivized labor (an organic collection of real people) was not.
Third, the Court’s disregard for worker Hedges’ interest in augmenting his own liberty to join a union as well the liberty-augmentation resulting from union membership (which would have allowed
him to participate in workplace decisions that affected his own wellbeing) was achieved primarily in two ways: (1) by focusing on property rights—the employer has them, the employee does not—and (2)
by defining liberty as the freedom from government coercion (negative right) as opposed to the right of US citizens to expect the government to help provide the resources workers need to fulfill their
own destinies (positive right).50 The Court’s formalistic reading of
the Constitution when it notes quite correctly that the Constitution
does not favor liberty (defined as the negative right, freedom from)
over property rights (defined by those who have them) seals the
deal.51
Combining these ideas, the Court creates the illusion of a tautology. If the government’s constitutional duty is to refrain from interfering with person O’s liberty to do what O wants to do with O’s
property, then the government cannot interfere with that right even
49

See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’
Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 29, 47–48
(2007) [hereinafter Toward a Foundational Theory].
50
See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 12–18.
51
See id.
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when what O wants to do is to interfere with another person’s (E’s)
liberty. The argument appears tautological because the “even when”
clause is never acknowledged; it is simply invisible. The government owes O a duty not to interfere with his property rights because
O has property rights. Full stop. There is no consideration of the socalled equal liberty interests of E. As a result, the Court never has to
explain why it is permissible to interfere with the employees’
equally valid liberty interests and free associational rights. As prominent constitutional law theorist Professor C. Edwin Baker (1947–
2009) observed, “This stipulation, often an intellectually lazy way
to avoid thinking through the legal implications of a state commitment to respect autonomy, makes the term [liberty] virtually meaningless for purposes of constructive legal theory or political theory . . . .”52
In sum, the Lochnerian free market paradigm features several
characteristics. Business entities are persons with individual rights,
including constitutional rights; freedom of contract encompasses a
business entity’s cognizable liberty interest to enter into a contract
to buy the labor of individual workers; workers also possess cognizable liberty interests, including the freedom to enter a contract
with business entities to sell their labor, which interests are protected
by Lochner.53 The freedom to associate with other workers or to
band together with other workers for the purposes of augmenting
bargaining leverage is invisible and, therefore, weightless.
B. The New Deal Partially Disrupts the Free Market Paradigm
The Lochnerian paradigm perished as a matter of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. In a series of cases challenging the Roosevelt
administration’s New Deal legislation, which expanded the power

52

C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251,
252 (2011).
53
See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 12–26; Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 63 (1905).
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of the federal government to regulate business, the Court held constitutional federal statutes regulating labor relations54 and social security,55 as well as public utilities56 and other industries.57 It also

54

See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 528, 553–54
(1937) (upholding amendment to the Railway Labor Act under interstate commerce clause); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 12, 30
(1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act under the Commerce Clause
as applied to large steel manufacturer); N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S.
49, 53, 57 (1937) (same; as applied to manufacturer of commercial trailers);
N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 72, 75 (1937)
(same; as applied to manufacturer of men’s clothing); Associated Press v.
N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 128–29 (1937) (same; as applied to a not-for-profit news
association); Wash. Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 142, 144, 146–
47 (1937) (same; as applied to interstate bus company).
55
See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 634, 645 (1937) (upholding Social
Security Act); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (upholding
provisions of the Social Security Act relating to taxes on employers and credits
toward those taxes for payments made to state unemployment insurance funds).
56
See Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 329 U.S. 90, 99–
100 (1946) (enforcing the Public Utility Holding Company Act); Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. U.S., 299 U.S. 232, 235, 247 (1936) (upholding FCC provisions regulating
telephone companies).
57
See, e.g., Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 340, 351–52 (1937)
(upholding Agricultural Adjustment Act); Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American
Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324, 340–41 (1937) (upholding federal monetary
policy embodied in the Gold Reserve Act of 1934); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. U.S.,
301 U.S. 308, 311 312 (1937) (upholding tax imposed on first domestic processor
of coconut oil); Sonzinsky v. U.S., 300 U.S. 506, 512–13 (1937) (upholding under
Congress’s taxing powers the National Firearms Act, which provides for an annual federal license tax on firearms dealers, as an aid to collecting tax revenue);
Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Tr. Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 460–61 (1937)
(upholding Bankruptcy Act’s regulatory effect on banking industry); U.S. v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 500–01 (1937) (upholding 35-day retroactive period on federal
tax on profits accruing from sale of interests in silver bullion); Ky. Whip & Collar
Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 348, 352–53 (1937) (upholding restrictions on the importation of goods made by prisoner labor into states prohibiting their sale); U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 325–28 (1936)
(upholding President’s authority to declare embargo on the sale of arms to promote peace).
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upheld state statutes implementing the New Deal or regulating industry under the states’ police powers,58 thereby officially ending
the Lochner era.59
The idea that the federal government is authorized to regulate
business entities disrupts the Lochnerian world view. The National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) illustrates this disruption and how, in
particular, Congress’s findings are in stark opposition to those posited by the Supreme Court in Coppage. NLRA Section 1 recognizes
that “employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms
of ownership association” are collective entities, as opposed to individual persons.60 Section 1 recognizes that there is an “inequality of
bargaining power” between these collective business entities and
“employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract[.]”61 Based on these congressional findings,
NLRA Section 7 grants employees “the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”62
Enactment of the NLRA and its subsequent enforcement by the
U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation,63 shattered the legal illusion of freedom of contract. But these
58

See Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 525–26 (1937) (upholding Alabama’s implementation of the Social Security Act); W. Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage law
for women).
59
See Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905) (striking down as unconstitutional New York state law prohibiting bakers’ from working more than 60
hours per week on the rationale that the state statute unlawfully interfered with
the bakers’ freedom to contract to work more hours).
60
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
61
Id.
62
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
63
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 12, 30 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act under the Commerce Clause as applied
to large steel manufacturer); see also N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S.
49, 53 (1937) (same, “manufacture, assembly, sale, and distribution of commercial trailers and of trailer parts and accessories” industry); N.L.R.B. v. FriedmanHarry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 72, 75 (1937) (same, purchase of raw
materials and the sale and distribution of men’s clothing industry); Associated
Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 128–29 (1937) (same, news gathering and distributing and interstate communication industries); Washington, Va. & Md.
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governmental acts did nothing to disrupt the economic paradigm
upon which the Lochner era was built. Just as progressives took action to chip away at and ultimately disrupt the Lochner judicial view,
free market conservatives took action almost immediately to whittle
away at the regulatory system. Perhaps tensions would have intensified even more rapidly had World War II not erupted and had organized labor not be so useful in the war effort.
C. Lochner’s Resurrection
During the post-war era, Congress, U.S. courts, and even the
NLRB itself have resurrected a Lochnerian paradigm by using free
market values to chip away at New Deal values and reinstate a view
of workers as mere factors of production rather than as individuals
who hold human rights. Sundry legislative acts, cases, and administrative orders illustrate this phenomenon.64 The 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments, as interpreted, present the earliest and the most infamous illustration of resurrection by Congress. For example,
amended Section 2(3) writes “supervisors” and “independent contractors” out of the NLRA’s protection,65 thereby returning those
workers to a pre-New Deal legal state, factors of production who do
not possess the right to freely associate.66 Indeed, Congress defined
“supervisor” broadly, so that any worker who, using “independent
judgment,” exercises even one of twelve enumerated powers “in the
interest of the employer” is a statutory supervisor and is not protected.67
Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 142, 144, 146–47 (1937) (same, transportation
industry).
64
See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
65
NLRA Section 2(3) broadly defines the term “employee” to include “any
employee” unless expressly excluded. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). In 1947, Congress amended Section 2(3) to exclude supervisors and independent contractors.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–97 (2012), legislatively overruling Packard Motor Car Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485, 491–92 (1947) (holding that low-level foremen are
statutory employees) and N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131–32
(1944) (holding that newspapers boys are statutory employees). See also 29
U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006). See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Employee, 5 F.I.U. L. REV. 495, 520–21 (2010) [hereinafter Vanishing Employee].
66
The Persistence of Union, supra note 26, at 201.
67
Section 2(11) provides:
The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
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The Court continued this trend most recently in a series of professional-supervisor cases, in which the Court twice rejected the
Board’s construction of the statutory exemption for supervisors to
exclude professionals who may direct other employees but should
not be considered statutory supervisors because in exercising such
direction those professional employees are using professional rather
than supervisory judgment.68 And most disappointingly, the NLRB,
the agency charged by Congress with fulfilling the purposes of the
NLRA, brought this trend to a new low by reading out of the
NLRA’s protection several subclasses of employees, including
graduate assistants69 and mentally disabled workers,70 neither of
whom are statutorily exempted.71
In late August 2016, the Obama Board tried to reverse this trend
by issuing Columbia University, which held that graduate teaching
assistants are employees, expressly overruling prior precedent.72
There, the Board acknowledged that answers to the question about

reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11); see The Persistence of Union, supra note 26, at 210.
68
See N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 715–717 (2001)
(rejecting N.L.R.B.’s definition of “independent judgment”); N.L.R.B. v. Health
Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 578–579 (1994) (rejecting the Board’s
construction of the statutory phrase “in the interest of the employer”); see also
The Persistence of Union, supra note 26, at 211.
69
See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004) (holding that graduate
student assistants are not statutory employees because they “have a predominately
academic, rather than economic, relationship with their school.”) overruled by
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2016). See also Leyland Stanford Junior
Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974) (holding that research assistants were not
employees because they were “primarily students”).
70
See Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982–83 (2004)
(holding that mentally disabled workers are not statutory employees because their
relationship with their employer is “primarily rehabilitative”).
71
There are only seven statutory exemptions: agricultural workers, domestic
servants, children/spouses, independent contractors, supervisors, employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, and public employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
The Act expressly covers all other workers. See The Persistence of Union, supra
note 26, at 212.
72
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2016).
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whether graduate teaching assistants were employees or not had oscillated several times in the past half century.73 Protections for these
workers is likely short-lived under an NLRB whose members will
be appointed by President Donald Trump and a Republican-dominated Senate.
What, if anything, does the NLRA’s definition of “employee”
say about Lochner, its counter-world view embodied in the New
Deal, and Lochner’s resurrection? The history of the congressional
amendment to that term, coupled with the judicial and administrative constructions of it, relays the philosophical conflict that is currently directing U.S. political theatre. As President Bill Clinton
stated at the 2012 Democratic Convention, “[w]e think ‘we’re all in
this together’ is a better philosophy than ‘you’re on your own[,]’”
referring to the conflicting world views of the Democratic and Republican Party platforms.74 President (then-candidate) Trump put
his unique spin on that philosophy when he now-infamously told

73
Id. (overruling Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004), which itself had
overruled New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 (2000) (holding that NYU
graduate assistants are employees)).
74
President Bill Clinton, Address to the Democratic Nat’l Convention (Sep.
5, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-09-05/economy/33617274_1_
jobs-equal-opportunity-democrats [hereinafter Clinton Address]. He ended the
speech with a similar comparison:
My fellow Americans, you have to decide what kind of country
you want to live in. If you want a you’re on your own, winner
take all society you should support the Republican ticket. If you
want a country of shared opportunities and shared responsibilities - a “we’re all in it together” society, you should vote for
Barack Obama and Joe Biden. If you want every American to
vote and you think it’s wrong to change voting procedures just
to reduce the turnout of younger, poorer, minority and disabled
voters, you should support Barack Obama. If you think the
President was right to open the doors of American opportunity
to young immigrants brought here as children who want to go
to college or serve in the military, you should vote for Barack
Obama. If you want a future of shared prosperity, where the
middle class is growing and poverty is declining, where the
American Dream is alive and well, and where the United States
remains the leading force for peace and prosperity in a highly
competitive world, you should vote for Barack Obama. Id.
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audience members at the 2016 Republic National Convention that
“I alone can fix it.”75
A similar observation—that a society with unions and a world
without unions reflects differing world views—has been repeated by
one of U.S. Labor’s academic gurus, Professor James A. Gross, who
wrote:
[T]hough some see workers’ human rights as threats
to the free enterprise system, others see the same
rights as concealing a selfish egoism no different
than the libertarian individualism central to the unregulated market philosophy. The language of individual rights does encourage people to consider only
“my rights,” “my house,” “my money,” “my property,” and “my family” . . . .No doubt, as Louis Blanc
wrote in 1847, claims of rights can and have been
used “to mask the injustice of a regime of individualism and the barbarism of the abandonment of the
poor” . . . .This ego-centric focus of human rights,
some have argued, operates to the detriment of
worker solidarity and collective action.76
What we see here, then, is an attempt by those who wish to augment the power of the powerful by critically characterizing policies
designed to empower working people as interfering with the property and liberty rights of those who already dominate society.
III. DEVELOPING A HUMAN RIGHTS RUBRIC FOR WORKERS’ RIGHTS
A. Interdependence: T.H. Marshall’s Political, Civil, and Social
Rights Rubric
British sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1893–1981)
focused on the idea of rights through citizenship. Writing in the mid75

Yoni Appelbaum, ‘I Alone Can Fix It’, THE ATLANTIC (July 21, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-rnc-speech-alonefix-it/492557/.
76
James A. Gross, The Human Rights Movement at U.S. Workplaces: Challenges and Changes, 65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 4 (2012) (citing LOUIS
HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 59 n.1 (Found. Press 1999) (emphasis added)).
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twentieth century in post-war Europe, T. H. Marshall presented a
historical account of the development of citizenship rights.77 These
rights, according to Marshall, can be divided into three types: political rights, civil rights, and social rights:
I propose to divide citizenship into three
parts . . . .civil, political, and social. The civil element
is composed of the rights necessary for individual
freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech,
thought and faith, the right to own property and to
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The
last is of a different order from the others, because it
is the right to defend and assert all one’s rights on
terms of equality with others and by due process of
law. This shows us that the institutions most directly
associated with civil rights are the courts of justice.
By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member
of a body invested with political authority or as an
elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of
local government. By the social element I mean the
whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the
full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in
the society. The institutions most closely connected
with it are the education system and the social services.78
Using Marshall’s rubric, political rights79 might be thought of as
the basic rights needed to participate in self-governance such as the
right to vote or to serve in political office; civil rights80 as the basic
freedoms enjoyed in the U.S., Canada, and other democracies such
77

T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
1964), reprinted in CLASS, CITIZENSHIP & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 71–95 (Greenwood Press, 1973).
78
Id. at 71–72 (emphasis added).
79
See id. at 71–72.
80
See id. at 71.
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as freedom of expression and religion; and social rights81 as the basics for survival in an advanced capitalist society, such as the right
to food, clothing, shelter, education, and health care. We can expand
this rubric to include two other types of rights: cultural rights82—
such as the right to speak one’s native language and the right to participate in one’s own cultural life—and economic rights83—such as
the right to a living wage and safe working conditions.
These ideas—to be a full member of society a person must have
certain basic civil, political, and social (including economic and cultural) rights—were highly influential in the establishment of the European Economic Community in 195784 and its development into
the European Union. But even in Europe and internationally, these
rights were weighted differently. As Canadian Professor Judy Fudge
has noted:
[D]uring the post-war period human rights were generally divided into different types with different legal
statuses . . . .The distinction between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social and economic
rights, on the other, deepened with the Cold War, and
in 1952 the United Nation’s General Assembly
passed a resolution to divide the rights proclaimed in
the UDHR [Universal Declaration of Human Rights]
into two separate covenants. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and

81

See id. at 72.
See BEN SAUL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 1191
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2014).
83
See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R,,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
1–3 (2008), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ESCR/FAQ%20on%20ES
CR-en.pdf.
84
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
82
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Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were adopted in 1966,
and came into force in 1976.85
By contrast, the idea that citizens are entitled to the full gamut
of political, civil, and social rights has not been as influential in the
U.S., which has focused on civil and political rights often at the expense of social rights.86 Indeed, while the U.S. has ratified the
ICCPR, it has not ratified the ICESCR.87
B. The Rights of Workers at the Workplace Are Often Difficult to
Classify Using T.H. Marshall’s Rubric
This returns us to Marshall’s rubric. My concern is not so much
in classifying rights, which can be used to misdirect the debate, as
President Clinton88 and Professor Gross89 point out, and as an analysis of the Lochner cases demonstrates, but in using rights-based
classifications to better understand the nature of workers’ rights.
Given this jurisprudential goal, the following observation about
Marshall’s rubric is illuminating. There appear to be easy cases and
hard cases in determining what types of rights fit into each category.
For example, free speech fits nicely into civil rights and the right to
vote fits squarely into the category of political rights. But where
does the right to bargain collectively fit? To the extent that collective
bargaining can be categorized as an exercise of a worker’s freedom
85

Judy Fudge, The New Discourse of Labor Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights?, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 29, 35–36 (2007) (emphasis in original); see also David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 189, 193 (2012) (explaining that “[t]he ideological importance of [social] rights gained force in the post-World-War II period, with a parade of postcolonial constitutions in the developing world.”).
86
See Landau, supra note 85, at 193–202 (characterizing the U.S. as “exceptional” in its rejection of incorporating social rights at the constitutional level, but
hypothesizing (and testing the hypothesis) that even countries, which have consciously attempted to incorporate social rights into their jurisprudence, tend to
favor middle and upper-class citizens rather than poor and other marginalized citizens).
87
See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en
(last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
88
Clinton Address, supra note 74.
89
Gross, supra note 76, at 4.
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of association, it appears to be a civil right. To the extent that it can
be categorized as participating in work-life decision-making,
thereby helping workers become more active members of their political communities, it may be a political right. Even more on point,
to the extent that the worker is a public-sector employee, then the
connection between collective bargaining and political rights is even
more robust.90 To the extent that the right to bargain collectively can
be viewed as the process by which workers secure a living wage,
then perhaps that right is an economic right.91 To summarize, the
composition of these rights is fuzzy at the boundaries and sometimes
overlapping even if we can imagine examples of these rights that
fall squarely into each category.
Whether workers’ rights or labor rights are civil rights, political
rights, social rights, some combination of these rights, or some other
unique right, such as economic or socio-economic rights, is not answered by Marshall’s rubric.92 Marshall indirectly concedes this
point when, just a few paragraphs after introducing his rubric, he
notes:
In the economic field the basic civil right is the right
to work, that is to say the right to follow the occupation of one’s choice in the place of one’s choice, subject only to legitimate demands for preliminary technical training . . . . By the beginning of the nineteenth
century this principle of individual economic freedom was accepted as axiomatic.93
Marshall then notes:
The original source of social rights was membership
of local communities and functional associations.
This source was supplemented and progressively re90
See, e.g., Anne Marie Lofaso, In Defense of Public Sector Unions, 28
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 301, 316–17, 321 (2011) [hereinafter Public Sector
Unions].
91
See generally MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 75.
92
For purposes of this paper, it doesn’t matter to me how we classify labor
rights. Instead, I am applying the insights of previous human rights thinkers to
better understand how we should think of labor rights.
93
MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 75–76.
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placed by a Poor Law and a system of wage regulation which were nationally conceived and locally administered . . . .As the pattern of the old order dissolved under the blows of a competitive economy, . . . the Poor Law was left high and dry as an
isolated survival from which the idea of social rights
was gradually drained away. But at the very end of
the eighteenth century there occurred a final struggle
between the old and the new, between the planned
(or patterned) society and the competitive economy.
And in this battle citizenship was divided against itself; social rights sided with the old and civil with the
new.94
What we see in just these few paragraphs is that workers’ rights
appear to cut across categorical boundaries.95 A worker’s freedom
to choose to work or not to work, or to select his or her profession
and professional training, may be classified as a civil, social, or economic right that is not enjoyed by everyone. Think of children of the
former Soviet Union forced to leave home at a young age to become
world-class gymnasts.96 A public school teacher’s right to strike to
protest a local school board’s action affecting teachers’ wages might
be classified as a political right,97 while wage and hour regulations
might best be seen as social rights. How should we characterize,
however, the rights of private-sector workers to distribute literature
at the workplace protesting a Presidential veto of a federal minimum
94

Id. at 79.
See id.
96
See Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 28. For an in-depth
examination of this issue, see Lisa Lindhorst, Note, Behind the Mask of Glory:
Combating Child Abuse in Olympic Boarding Schools, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 353, 354 (2015).
97
See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968) (holding
teacher’s discharge unconstitutional under First Amendment). There, a school
board discharged a public school teacher for writing and publishing in a local
newspaper a letter critical of a proposed tax increase based primarily on the school
board’s allocation of money between educational and athletic programs. The
Court held that “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment”
“absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him[.]” Id. at
574.
95
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wage law or protesting a state’s attempt to constitutionalize its rightto-work statute?98 Is this act of concerted activity best viewed as part
of the civil right to freedom of association; the political right to protest; or the social right to obtain a living wage? In this case, the classification matters, because the National Labor Relations Board generally does not extend its legislative protections to non-economic
concerted activity and the U.S. Constitution does not protect civil or
political protests conducted on private property.
The sundry nature of workers’ rights explains this classification
problem. The workplace is a microcosm of society. Just as citizens
want to limit the government’s coercive powers, workers want to
limit their employers’ coercive authority over them.99 Just as citizens can limit the government’s authority both procedurally and
substantively, workers can enjoy both procedural and substantive
rights.100
Labor rights suffer another classification infirmity. When thinking of workers’ rights in terms of classical labor rights, we think of
the procedural rights afforded under Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities . . . .101
Notice that not one of the rights guaranteed under Section 7 is
an actual substantive right.102 There is no right to a particular wage,
98

Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 558 (1978).
See generally Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the
Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).
100
See Gross, supra note 76, at 3 (noting that “[t]he purpose of human rights
is to eliminate or minimize the vulnerability that leaves people at the mercy of
others who have the power to hurt them.”).
101
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
102
In a conversation with Hugh Collins, Vinerian Professor of English Law,
in April 2016 at AllSouls College, Oxford, Professor Collins pointed out to me
that the right to bargain collective and to be recognized by an employer are sub99
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a particular work schedule, or a particular job. There is no right to
job security, safe working conditions, or freedom from discrimination.
Instead, Section 7 guarantees workers the right to band together
for two purposes. First, Section 7 guarantees workers the right to
band together “for the purpose of collective bargaining”103 over
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment[.]”104
No particular outcome is, however, guaranteed. This interest in allowing the parties to come to their own private order is so embedded
in U.S. tradition that the NLRA forbids the government from intervening to create a particular outcome that it deems socially more
desirable.105 Second, Section 7 guarantees workers the right to band
together for the purpose of other mutual aid or protection. As Judge
Learned Hand so eloquently explained:
When all the other workmen in a shop make common
cause with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they engage
in a “concerted activity” for “mutual aid or protection,” although the aggrieved workman is the only
one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by their action each one of
them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of

stantive rights. That is true, but not in the sense that I am contemplating. By substantive, I mean more than being able to claim an affirmative duty on the employer. I mean those goods for which unions might bargain – living wages, benefits, good working conditions, among other goods.
103
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
104
29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See also N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (limiting an employer’s duty to bargain with a
union to mandatory subjects of bargaining; explaining that the parties may bargain
over other “permissive” subjects; and forbidding bargaining over “illegal” subjects—subjects that conflict with the obligations and rights granted under the
NLRA).
105
See H.K. Porter Co., Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1970) (holding that the Board is without power to compel a company or a union to agree to
any particular substantive contractual provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement).
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the support of the one whom they are all then helping; and the solidarity so established is “mutual aid”
in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.106
This clause grants workers the right, among others, to organize
at the workplace;107 to protest low wages or poor working conditions
by handbilling,108 by picketing,109 by striking, and even by engaging
in a spontaneous walkout;110 to protest—even at the workplace—
low employment standards of the working class in general;111 to use
governmental processes to force nonunion employer’s to create better working conditions;112 to demand a witness at a disciplinary
meeting;113 to make political pleas involving workers’ rights at the
workplace;114 to bring a union witness to an investigatory interview
106

N.L.R.B. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505–
06 (2d Cir. 1942). See also Hous. Insulation Contractors Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 386
U.S. 664, 668–69 (1967).
107
See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, 795–96, 798
(1945) (holding that employees have the right to organize at workplace during
nonworking time and in nonworking areas).
108
See, e.g., Roundy’s Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 674 F.3d 638, 655 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that nonemployee union organizers have a Section 7 right to handbill
customers of grocery store to protest store’s use of cheap labor and to inform customers that the savings were not passed down to them).
109
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that Section 7’s mutual-aid-or-protection clause protects area standards
picketing).
110
See, e.g., NL.R.B. v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–15 (1962)
(holding that NLRA Section 7 protects spontaneous walkout by at-will employees
in protest of frigid cold working conditions).
111
See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565–67 (1978) (holding
that employer unlawfully prevented employees from distributing at the workplace
union newsletter criticizing presidential veto of minimum wage law).
112
See, e.g., Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 240 F.3d 26, 30–31 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (upholding Board’s determination that filing environmental objections
to nonunion company’s construction and zoning applications constitutes Section
7 protected activity because its purpose was to force that company to pay area
standard wages, which would in turn benefit union workers in the area by increasing job opportunities and augmenting bargaining power).
113
See N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260–64 (1975).
114
See Eastex, Inc., 437 U.S. at 565–70 (holding that employer unlawfully
prevented employees from distributing at the workplace union newsletter urging
workers to write to their state representatives to oppose incorporating state rightto-work statute into state constitution).
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that the employee reasonably believes may result in discipline;115 to
invoke contractual rights under a collective-bargaining agreement;116 and to utilize the Board’s processes to vindicate Section 7
rights.117 It is in these senses that Section 7 is the labor analogue to
political rights.
These predominantly procedural labor rights are not to be confused with the situation where a labor union flexes its political
power. For example, in South Africa, black trade unions wielded
political power to oppose apartheid:
The development of black trade unionism in the late
apartheid era occurred in the context of opposition to
racist and authoritarian workplace regimes. Its power
derived from its ability to organise and to render first
the workplace and then the country ‘ungovernable.’
In short, the militant unionism of this period, its ability to unite black workers and the influence it exercised in the rest of society, was a product of racial
despotism in general, compounded by employer intransigence and state repression.118
The “right” of black trade unions in apartheid South Africa to
engage in such protests is reminiscent of the “right” of unions in the
U.S. to protest poor wages, hours, and working conditions when the
union is seeking legislative change from the government.119 Think
of the protests of public sector workers in Wisconsin who sat in protest of Governor Scott Walker’s legislative initiatives to strip those
workers of their collective bargaining rights.120 Those actions start
to look political in nature.
115

See, e.g., J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 262–64.
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831–37
(1984).
117
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2012); see generally N.L.R.B. v. Scrivener, 405
U.S. 117, 121–26 (1972).
118
SAKHELA BUHLUNGU, The State of Trade Unions in Post-Apartheid South
Africa, in STATE OF THE NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2003–2004 185 (John Daniel et
al. eds., HSRC Press 2003).
119
See supra notes 107–117 and accompanying text.
120
See Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Angry Demonstrations in Wisconsin as Cuts Loom, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/us/17wisconsin.html.
116

598

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:565

That traditional labor rights tend to be procedural rights in furtherance of economic rights also does not mean that substantive
rights for workers are absent from the legal landscape.121 Such substantive rights are typically not called labor rights in the U.S. We
have different labels for them. “Civil rights” is the term we use when
speaking of Title VII’s prohibition on workplace discrimination and
harassment.122 The Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions typically fall into the category of socioeconomic rights.123 Health and safety laws under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act might be viewed as social rights.124 Whatever
we call them, they constitute, in theory, the basic floor of rights upon
which all workers are entitled to walk. All too often in the U.S., that
floor of rights is also a ceiling and sometimes a drop ceiling, below
which workers’ often find themselves.
T.H. Marshall makes a similar observation: “Trade unionism
has . . . created a secondary system of industrial citizenship parallel
with and supplementary to the system of political citizenship.”125 It
is through this industrial citizenship and system of industrial democracy where workers can fight for some of the things that matter most
to them as U.S. citizens—job security with a living wage and good
working conditions.126

121

See Angie Cowan Hamada, The NLRA: A Real Class Act: Employees’ Substantive NLRA Right to Pursue Concerted Legal Action, A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP.
L. 1, 7 (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor
_law/2015/march/dll/hamada.authcheckdam.pdf.
122
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
123
29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (2012).
124
29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (2012).
125
MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 94.
126
Professor Guy Mundlak reads Marshall as suggesting three themes tying
labor with citizenship: “[T]he importance of labor market institutions (most notably — trade unions), their distinct position in comparison to end-norms (labor
standards), and the importance of active participation.” Guy Mundlak, Industrial
Citizenship, Social Citizenship, Corporate Citizenship: I Just Want My Wages, 8
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 719, 724 (2007).
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IV. A TALE OF TWO CITIES:127 A POSITIVE LAW AND NATURAL
LAW ACCOUNT OF WORKERS’ HUMAN RIGHTS
To assess a legal system’s record on human rights, it is useful, if
not necessary, to compare laws and/or legal practices within a specific jurisdiction to a human rights standard. In this Article, I am
interested in comparing U.S. labor law to two such standards: (1)
positive law, by which I mean well-established, well-respected international labor standards; and (2) natural law, by which I mean
law cognizable through reason and derived from human nature,
which would universally apply to all humans. To clarify, my argument is two-tiered. In Section IV.A and IV.B, I examine some answers to the question, “What are human rights?” In Section V, I examine answers to the question, “What human rights standards guide
(positive law) or should guide (natural law) labor law?”
To clarify, Section IV describes standards. In Section IV.A, I
examine positive human rights both as a concept and as they exist. I
do not develop a theory of what positive law is. I am only interested
in identifying (Sections IV.A.1 and A.2) and then applying (Section
IV.A.3) well-established, well-respected international human rights
standards to U.S. labor law for purposes of assessing how they compare with these positive human-rights standards.128 By contrast, in
Section IV.B, I do attempt to develop a comprehensive natural law
definition of human rights. Admittedly, this is confusing because
natural law has traditionally influenced the positive law of human
rights. But the two projects are distinct. One ultimately compares
127
This reference, although apropos of Charles Dickens’ book by the same
name, is intended to evoke images of the SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 3
(Marcus Dods trans., Random House, Inc. 1993). In that book, St. Augustine compares human laws and culture of the Roman Empire to the ideal society in which
God’s laws rule. While there is a struggle between the two, the City of God will
ultimately prevail. Id. at 3–5, 38–39.
128
For purposes of this paper I am not interested in the questions that the latetwentieth century legal philosophers tried to answer. For my purposes, whether
the law is a sovereign’s command backed by threat of sanction or whether law is
a system of primary and secondary rules is irrelevant to my immediate goals – to
identify legal rules that govern particular circumstances, a task that lawyers understand and perform routinely. Compare JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE
XXV-XXIX (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., The Curwen Press 1954) (1832) with H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213–26 (Penelope A. Bullock & Joseph Raz eds.,
2d ed. 1994).
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U.S. labor laws to international human rights laws129 and the other
develops a natural law theory of human rights that establishes
standards by which to judge U.S. labor law.130
A. Comparing U.S. Labor Law to International Human Rights Law
1. STANDARD: THE U.N. DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PROMOTES HUMAN RIGHTS AS UNIVERSAL, INALIENABLE,
INDIVISIBLE, INTERDEPENDENT, AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY
According to the U.N. Office for the High Commission on Human Rights: “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings,
whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all
equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These
rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.” 131
The following accepted characteristics of human rights are all
present here:
(1) Universal – “Human rights are rights inherent in
all human beings.”132
(2) Inalienable – “We are all equally entitled to our
human rights . . . .”133
(3) Indivisible and Interdependent – “These rights
are all interrelated, interdependent and invisible.”134
(4) Non-discriminatory – “We are all equally entitled
to our human rights without discrimination.”135
129

For an excellent description of the positivist approach to human rights, see
Virginia Mantouvalou, Are Labour Rights Human Rights?, 3 EUR. LAB. L. J. 151,
152–56 (2012).
130
This approach to labor rights is rare, although it is the approach that I favor.
For a recent survey of the literature on this point, see id. at 163–69.
131
What are Human Rights?, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRi
ghts.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
132
Id. (emphasis added).
133
Id. (emphasis added).
134
Id.
135
Id.
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The text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Preamble also promotes all four of these characteristics:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged
the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people . . . .136
That the U.N. General Assembly in this Declaration views human rights as universal, inalienable, and non-discriminatory is patently obvious from the plain language of the first clause, which recognizes the “inherent dignity” and the “inalienable” and “equal”
rights of “all members of the human family.”137 The use of the terms
inherent and all reveal the universal character of human rights. That
humans hold these inalienable rights equally tells us that we all hold
them permanently and that no one is more entitled to them than another.138 The use of the phrase inherent dignity strengthens the significance of the permanent and nondiscriminatory status of these
rights.
That human rights are indivisible and interdependent—that
these rights reinforce one another in the sense that the whole is
greater than the sum of its parts—comes from a contextual reading
of the text. The first paragraph posits that state recognition of human
rights is the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world.”139 The Preamble proceeds in the second paragraph to claim

136

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948).
137
See id. (emphasis added).
138
See id.
139
Id.
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that “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind[.]”140
That same paragraph then proclaims a universal goal of humanity to
create “a world” enjoying certain freedoms, including the “freedom
from fear.”141 The question is, of course, what rights, other than freedom of speech and belief, which the Preamble specifically mentions,
when taken together, would create a world free from fear? Freedom
of speech and belief, alone, are not sufficient. If life is a basic human
right, then humans need subsistence in the form of food, water, shelter, and clothing.
2. OTHER CHARACTERISTICS: THE EXTENT TO WHICH
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS INDIVIDUAL OR
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND OTHER STICKY ISSUES
In addition to these characteristics, we can ask whether these
rights are:







Individual, collective, or both?
Weighty or insignificant when weighed against other
rights?
Sundry or few?
Aspirational or minimal?
Moral, legal, or political?
Ideal or pragmatic?

U.S. labor law thinkers have long noticed the tension between
labor rights, which have been constructed (at least originally) as collective rights, and civil rights against workplace discrimination,
which have been constructed as individual rights.142 Indeed, labor
rights have found only a hostile home in the U.S. in part because of
their collective nature, which does not intuitively fit into the robustly
individualistic and liberty-loving American culture.143

140
141
142
143

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See generally Hamada, supra note 121, at 8.
See generally The Persistence of Union, supra note 26.
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But there is nothing unique about labor rights such that they
must be construed as collective rights. Section 7 rights144 illustrate
this point. The rights to join a union or to refrain from joining a
union belong to the individual.145 The right to call a strike belongs
to the union, at least under the NLRA.146 Now, what if it is possible
for either the individual or the union to hold the right. The right to
strike illustrates the point. As explained above, the right to strike is
often construed under U.S. law as a collective right insofar as the
union calls the strike. But surely the law could have developed such
that the individual held the right to strike in the sense that the individual could withhold his or her labor whether or not the union
called a strike. Indeed, such a legal system could accommodate both
the individual right to strike and the collective right to strike. In such
a system, a conflict between the individual (who wants to go on
strike) and the union (which does not), or visa versa, might have to
be resolved.147
Whether human rights are sufficiently substantial to outweigh
other rights is both a legal and a moral question, which depends in
part upon the significance of the rights involved.148 As a matter of
legal reality, judges are trained to balance rights.149 Whether they
get that balance right or wrong has legal, political, and moral dimensions.150 For example, some might think that there is a legally correct balance between radio personality Rush Limbaugh’s right to
freely broadcast that Bella Abzug, Betty Friedan, Anita Hill, Pat
Schroeder, Eleanor Smeal, Gloria Steinem, and Molly Yard are
“feminazis”—meaning a type of feminist who is committing a modern-day Holocaust by supporting abortion rights—and the right of
these women not to be slandered.151 The political dimensions to this
144

29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
Id.
146
Id.
147
See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition, Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 52,
76 (1975).
148
See Gross, supra note 76, at 3–4.
149
See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975).
150
See id.
151
A young Ronald Dworkin’s “The Right Thesis” comes to mind here. See
id. at 1063–64 (arguing that judges should determine the right answer in hard
cases by determining which proposed solution better fits the case law); Ronald
Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978).
145
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question are more obvious. Those who sincerely believe that abortion is morally reprehensible are more likely to view Limbaugh’s
free speech rights as weightier than the women’s rights to maintain
their reputation. Pornography might afford a better example here.
Those who view pornography as harmful to women because of its
ostensibly degrading nature are less likely to consider the right to
produce, distribute, possess, or view pornography as a weighty free
speech right.
Furthermore, the number of human rights is both a political
question and a moral question.152 It’s a political question in two
ways. First, a sovereign nation’s legislative body may be tasked with
enacting positive law, including laws protecting human rights.
Second, a group of sovereign nations may sign treaties agreeing that
certain rights count as human rights.
But just how many human rights there are can also be formulated
as a moral question. For example, Harvard Professor John Rawls
(1921–2002) wrote that human rights are:
[A] special class of rights of universal application
and hardly controversial in their general intention.
They are part of a reasonable law of peoples and
specify limits on the domestic institutions required of
all peoples by that law. In this sense they specify the
outer boundary of admissible domestic law of societies in good standing in a just society of peoples.153
Rawls added that human rights play three roles: they legitimize
the legal order, they justify military or economic sanctions if violated, and they “‘set a moral limit to pluralism.’”154 Rawls concedes
that only a few rights – the “right to life, liberty, and security in person”; freedom from torture, could ever meet this definition.155 He
152

See Gross, supra note 76, at 3, 14.
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36, 59 (1993) (emphasis added).
154
Id. (quoting David Luban, The Romance of the Nation State, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 392, 396 (1980)).
155
Rawls, supra note 153, at 59 n.45 (adding that the conventions against
genocide and apartheid implicate human rights). See also Joseph Raz, Human
Rights Without Foundations, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 332
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., Oxford U. Press 2010) (expressing concern about the proliferation of rights classified as human rights).
153
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then views other human rights (e.g., dignity, social security, equal
pay) as “liberal aspirations.”156
For my purposes, there are two classes (“cities”) of human
rights. First are positive human rights—those enacted by legislation
or agreed upon by treaty (or possibly developed by the common
law). Second, are natural human rights—those that exist independent of legal action. Whether positive human rights are individual,
collective, or weighty, and whether or not they are few or many is
merely a function of figuring out what the law is at any given moment in time in any given culture. To the extent that positive and
natural human rights don’t match, natural human rights are those to
which we aspire. In my view, human rights should be individual or
collective, but they must be weighty. Human rights should also be
more common than Rawls would advocate, but the number of them
would be limited by their significance. However, it does not make
sense to me to think in terms of the number of human rights. Rather
a values-based approach to human rights allows us to generate many
different kinds of rights dependent on the type of society in which
we live.157 In this way, positive and natural human rights will eventually align.158
3. THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LABOR COMMUNITY CONSIDERS
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AND CHILD
LABOR, AND FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
TO BE HUMAN RIGHTS
The League of Nations, the brainchild of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson,159 was founded in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles,160 ending World War I.161 The purpose of establishing the
156

Rawls, supra note 153, at 59 n.45.
See, e.g., Vanishing Employee, supra note 65, at 500.
158
See id.
159
See NOBEL LECTURES: PEACE 1926–1950 (Frederick W. Haberman ed.,
World Scientific Publishing Co., 1991) According to the Nobel Peace Prize address, the Committee awarded President Wilson the Nobel Peace Prize “because
in his celebrated Fourteen Points the President of the United States has succeeded
in bringing a design for a fundamental law of humanity into present-day international politics.” Id. (emphasis added).
160
Treaty of Versailles, pt. 1, June 28, 1919, 2 U.S.T.I.A. 43.
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See id. The idea of linking peace with some sort of international organization appears to go back as far as the Enlightenment. For example, Immanuel Kant
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League of Nations was “to promote international co-operation and
to achieve international peace and security.”162 The idea was to promote peace through collective action—political, economic, social,
and military.163 Article 23 of the League of Nations’ Covenant made
two promises with regard to labor:
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of
international conventions . . . the Members of the
League:
(a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and
humane conditions of labour for men, women, and
children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and
maintain the necessary international organisations . . . .
(c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to
the traffic in women and children . . . .164
At the same time, as part of the same treaty that ended World
War I and in partial fulfillment of these promises, the International
Labour Organization was created, “to reflect the belief that universal
and lasting peace can be accomplished only if it is based on social
justice.”165 The ILO Constitution identified the following areas of
improvement that it deemed necessary for universal and lasting
peace:

advocates for a “league of nations,” in which all sovereigns would “enter . . . into
a constitution similar to the civil constitution.” IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL
PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795), https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm. This paper does not purport to trace the history of this linkage,
although such a study would be useful.
162
Treaty of Versailles, supra note 160, at 48.
163
See id.
164
Treaty of Versailles, supra note 160, art. 23 at 57.
165
Int’l
Labour
Organization
[ILO],
Origins
and
History,
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm (last visited
Mar. 7, 2017).
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·

the regulation of the hours of work, including
the establishment of a maximum working day
and week[;]

·

the regulation of labour supply, [and] the prevention of unemployment[;]

·

the provision of an adequate living wage[;]

·

the protection of the worker against sickness,
disease and injury arising out of his employment[;]

·

the protection of children, young persons and
women[;]

·

provision for old age and injury[;]

·

protection of the interests of workers when
employed in countries other than their own[;]

·

recognition of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value[;]

·

recognition of the principle of freedom of association[;]

·

the organization of vocational and technical
education, and other measures . . . .166
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These areas of improvement, which focus on social and economic rights—wages; hours; social security provisions for children,
the elderly, the disabled, and the unemployed; immigration; discrimination; and job training/education—remain relevant today.167
More international organizations were established in the aftermath of World War II. Most prominently, on October 24, 1945, the
United Nations was founded to replace the League of Nations.168 On
166

Int’l Labour Organization [ILO], ILO Constitution, http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO
(last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
167
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(d).
168
United Nations, History of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
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December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted what has
come to be known as the first international instrument on human
rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR].169 Article 1 proclaimed that: “All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”170
The UDHR’s assertion—that humans are “equal in dignity” to one
another—and the additional assertion that humans are special because they are “endowed with reason and conscience”—are common Enlightenment themes (with even earlier roots).171
Notwithstanding this strong endorsement of fundamental human
rights in the mid-twentieth century and notwithstanding the belief
that peace is inextricably linked to social and economic prosperity
and parity, it wasn’t until fairly recently, in 1998, that the ILO
adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work.172 In this declaration, the ILO named the following four fundamental work rights:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation.173
In the U.S., our positive law fares well—at least at first blush.174
Several statutes protect worker freedom of association, including the
169

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,

1948).
170

See id. at art. 1.
See generally KANT, infra note 189, at 38.
172
See Int’l Labour Organization [ILO], ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (June 15, 2010), http://www.ilo
.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wc
ms_467653.pdf [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
173
Id. at 7.
174
See infra notes 227–253 and accompanying text for in-depth discussion of
how these laws have been interpreted.
171
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National Labor Relations Act,175 the Railway Labor Act,176 the Federal Labor Relations Act,177 and many state constitutions and legislative acts.178 The Thirteenth Amendment officially ended slavery
in the U.S.:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.179
Congress has passed statutes to enforce this amendment, most
recently, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000.180 Further, Congress abolished child labor when it enacted the
Fair Labor Standards Act.181 Congress has endeavored to eliminate
workplace discrimination with the passage of a series of statutes
since the 1960s, including, for example, the Equal Pay Act of
1963,182 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,183 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,184 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.185
In the U.S., few would argue with the proposition that freedom
from forced labor and any kind of child labor constitute human

175

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, §§ 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.).
177
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, §§ 701 et. seq., 92
Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
178
See generally MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 89 (2d ed. 2010).
179
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
180
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, §§ 101, 1001, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 22 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
181
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
182
29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2012).
183
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
184
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
185
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
176
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rights. Some might argue against the idea that freedom from workplace discrimination is a human right, but those few might at least
concede that it is a civil right, as the full name of the Title VII statute
(the Civil Rights Act)186 suggests. But there is currently no consensus regarding whether the status of freedom of association, as applied to workers, constitutes a human right.187 The Republican Party
platform advances the position that unions are harmful to businesses
because they increase labor costs.188 It promises, for example, to
eliminate card check, eliminate Project Labor Agreements, and to
circumvent collective bargaining by permitting employers to unilaterally raise wages for select employees.189 The promise to circumvent collective bargaining would essentially eviscerate freedom of
association. Given the political landscape, it is difficult to claim with
a straight face that the U.S. views worker freedom of association as
a human right, notwithstanding the positive law’s protection of that
freedom.
B. Deconstructing Human Rights
1. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF “HUMAN” IN HUMAN
RIGHTS: KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE’S HUMANITY
FORMULATION
Perhaps the most persuasive and influential Enlightenment
thinker to espouse the view that there is something dignified about
humanity is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).190 Kant posited that there
is one fundamental law of morality—the categorical imperative.191

186

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
See, e.g., ILO Declaration, supra note 172 (listing freedom of association
as a fundamental work right, but not explicitly naming it a human right).
188
See generally 2012 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION PLATFORM 5, 7–
8 (2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/414158/2012-republicannational-convention-platform.pdf. For example, the Republican Party Platform
claims that “the Democrats’ Davis-Bacon law continues to drive up infrastructure
construction and maintenance costs for the benefit of that party’s union stalwarts.”
Id. at 5.
189
See id. at 7–8.
190
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (Allen W. Wood ed. trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1795).
191
See id. at 36.
187
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In Kant’s view, all other laws of morality derive from the categorical
imperative (CI).192
Although at some point Kant succinctly defined CI as “a law for
every will of a rational being,”193 Kant thought that his CI could be
expressed in several different ways. The first formulation, known as
the law of nature, tells us to act in accordance with principles that
could become a universal rule of law that all members of your society (universality) would accept: “So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.”194
To determine whether an action violates the categorical imperative,
simply ask yourself what would happen if everyone were to follow
the proposed principle. If the answer to that question is something
like, “It is possible for everyone to act in accordance with this rule
and the rule would never contradict itself,” then the proposed rule
meets the test of the categorical imperative. One of the most common examples of a proposed rule that fails the categorical imperative is the principle of deception. Kant gives the example of the person who lies to borrow money knowing that he cannot pay it back.195
That person acts in accordance with the following principle: “If I
believe myself to be in pecuniary distress, then I will borrow money
and promise to pay it back, although I know this will never happen.”196 To determine whether this principle is morally right, one
must simply universalize the law.197 In rejecting the maxim of deception Kant observes: “I see right away that it could never be valid
as a universal law of nature and still agree with itself, but rather it
would necessarily contradict itself because eventually no one could
rely on promises that are routinely broken.198
Before moving to the CI’s second formulation, it is instructive
to briefly discuss CI’s third and fourth formulations—the autonomy
principle and the kingdom of ends, which further universalizes
Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative.199 The third
formulation, known as the principle of autonomy, tells us that we
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

See id. at 36–37.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 38 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 39.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 36, 50, 56.
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should always act as if we are making universal rules: Act as “a will
legislating universally through all its maxims[.]”200 Similarly, the
fourth formulation, known as the kingdom of ends, tells us to act as
if we were the legal official of some universal law-making body:
“Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member
for a merely possible realm of ends . . . .”201
It is the categorical imperative’s second formulation, known as
the principle of ends, the principle of dignity, or the humanity principle, where Kant seems to add something more.202 Kant’s humanity
principle tells us to treat people as if each person has intrinsic value
simply because each person is human: “Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other,
always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means.”203
The humanity principle forbids us to act in ways that exploit human
beings or at least in ways that merely exploit human beings.204 Presumably, hiring workers per se does not violate the CI even though
the employer uses its workers in furtherance of its purposes. The
moral question inherent in a natural human rights approach to workers’ rights is whether these workers are being used merely as a
means. Those interested in workers’ rights must determine whether,
as a matter of fact (as opposed to a matter of law), workers are actually being used in an exploitative manner. This is essentially an empirical assessment of the moral claim: Are institutions, which are
designed to protect workers, doing their job? It is also a legal strategy for developing positive labor standards, which reflect a particular conception of human dignity and autonomy while minimizing
the impact of state and business coercion of workers.205 This particular formulation of the CI further and most clearly shows how the
CI is in tension with political (or even economic) utilitarianism, by

200

Id. at 50 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 56 (internal citations omitted).
202
See id. at 46–47.
203
Id. (emphasis in original).
204
See id.
205
This approach echos, at least to some degree, what Professor Mantouvalou
calls the instrumental approach to labor rights as human rights. See Mantouvalou,
supra note 129, at 151, 156 (quoting PHILIP ALSTON, LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN
RIGHTS 3 (2005).
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which majority rule governs and the ends justify the means.206 Morality requires that when people act we consider the humanity of
each person and the effect of our actions on others’ humanity.207
2. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF “RIGHTS” IN HUMAN RIGHTS
i. Varying Conceptions of a Legal Right Under Hohfeld’s Rubric
The concept of a legal right has many formulations or conceptions.208 Perhaps the greatest twentieth-century thinker regarding legal-rights discourse is Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879–
1918), who carefully distinguished among these varying conceptions of legal rights.209 Professor Hohfeld devised a rubric to remedy
his complaint that the legal term, “right,” was being used by judges
in a sloppy and inconsistent manner.210 Hohfeld comprehensively
deconstructed the concept of rights into four different conceptions:
claims, privileges, powers, and immunities.211 Here, I focus on what
Hohfeld calls the claim right.212
ii. Claim Rights Entail Rights Holders, Duty Holders, Interests,
and Values
According to Professor Hohfeld, “[a] duty or a legal obligation
is that which one ought or ought not to do . . . .When a right is invaded, a duty is violated.”213 In other words, where there’s a right
there’s a correlative duty, to use Hohfeldian lingo.214 Hohfeld used
an example from property law to explain this conception of a claim
206

See id. at 161–62.
See KANT, supra note 190, at 46–47.
208
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Fundamental
Legal Conceptions]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter
Some Fundamental Conceptions]; JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 166
(Clarendon Press 1986) [hereinafter MORALITY OF FREEDOM].
209
See Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 208, 716–17.
210
See id. at 717.
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See id. at 710.
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See id. at 718.
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Some Fundamental Conceptions, supra note 208, at 32 (quotations omitted).
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See id.
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right: “if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s
land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward
X to stay off the place.”215
The idea of claim holders and duty holders logically follows
from Hohfeld’s analysis of claim rights.216 However, it is Professor
Joseph Raz who crystallized this aspect of the formulation: “‘X has
a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason
for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”217 This means
that there are always several important variables when analyzing
claim rights.218 First there is capacity: who is the rights holder and
who is the duty holder?219 Then there is the nature of the right, which
is based on interests and values.220
iii. The Claim Right: Where There’s a Right, There’s a Duty
According to Raz, “[r]ights are grounds of duties in others. The
duties grounded in a right may be conditional.”221 To illustrate his
point, Raz uses an example from the workplace:
Consider the duty of an employee to obey his employer’s instructions concerning the execution of his
job. It is grounded in the employer’s right to instruct
his employees. But it is a conditional duty, i.e., a duty
(in matters connected with one’s employment) to
perform an action if instructed by the employer to do
so. When the condition which activates the duty is an
action of some person, and when the duty is conditional on it because it is in the right-holder’s interest
to make that person able to activate the duty at will,
then the right confers a power on the person on
whose behaviour the duty depends.222

215
216
217
218
219
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See MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 166.
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See id.
See id.
See id. at 166–67.
Id. at 167.
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Raz’s example shows that the employee’s duty to obey her employer is grounded in the employer’s right to direct its employees.223
Raz is a legal positivist. So his example does not mean to connote
that employers have some sort of fundamental or natural right to
obedience from their employees.224 His example, however, is highly
descriptive of, for example, American employment law, which routinely places the duty of obedience on employees.225 Indeed, insubordination—the failure to obey an employer’s instructions—is a
common cause of discharge in the U.S.226 This value is so embedded
in U.S. culture that when one private law school in Michigan recently fired a tenured member of its faculty for refusing to teach
constitutional law, a subject she had never taught before and was
likely incompetent to teach, the law school won.227
iv. Legal Capacity
According to Raz, “[a]n individual is capable of having rights if
and only if either his well-being is of ultimate value or he is an ‘artificial person’ . . . .”228 The example of an artificial person that Raz
gives is the corporation.229 Once again, Raz’s positivism comes
through in so far as he notes that an artificial person—something
other than a being of ultimate value—is capable of possessing
rights.230 For Raz, capacity is something that is granted by the positive law.231
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2012).
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See id.
230
See id.
231
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343
(2010) (explaining that the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment
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Raz’s definition is problematic insofar as it includes artificial
persons.232 To be sure, Raz is descriptively correct in identifying artificial persons as entities that have legal capacity under positive
law.233 Indeed, in our world as it is currently organized, business
entities such as corporations and workers’ rights institutions, such
as unions, have legal capacity and therefore can possess legal
rights.234 But in a world that is changing rapidly and at an exponential rate, there may be a time in which we are confronted with the
question whether other entities, such as robotic cars or robotic people have legal rights.235 Relatedly, the definition does not, at least at
first blush, account for animal rights—an important subject in labor
law to the extent that animals may be used by humans as beasts of
burden.236
v. Nature of Rights
In a democratic republic, like the U.S., positive rights come
about through the political process.237 This often means compromise
among competing groups based on the interests of those natural and
artificial persons.238 Accordingly, “the nature and extent of any legal
right is only a reflection of the value attached by the political system
to various, often conflicting, interests.”239 It is therefore instructive
to examine those various interests and to understand the values underlying those interests to fully describe the nature of legal rights
232

See MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 166.
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See generally Joshua F. Cheslow, The Future of the Law: Four Practice
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See MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 166; see also Denise Sullivan, Animal Labor Laws, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/animal-laborlaws-74377.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
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and to determine whether a change in policy is needed to better fulfill the desired interests and values.240 In other words, using the ideas
of Professors Hohfeld and Raz as guides, we can see a relationship
among legal claim rights, interests, and values.
If this is correct—that rights are based on interests and grounded
in values—then are rights only substantively valid when they are
grounded in morally sound values? Imagine a circumstance under
which a law is properly promulgated in accordance with what Professor H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992) called a sovereign nation’s secondary rules.241 A member of the House of Representatives introduces
a bill; that bill goes to committee, where it is revised; the bill is then
reported to the House floor where it is debated; the bill is voted on;
the same process takes place on the Senate-side of Congress.242
Once the bill passes both houses in the same form, the bill is sent to
the President, who then has three choices.243 The President can sign
the bill, in which case it becomes law; the President can veto the bill,
in which case the bill returns to Congress, where a two-thirds vote
of both houses can override the President’s veto; or the President
can do nothing, in which case the bill becomes law after ten days if
Congress is in session; otherwise the bill does not become law.244
Let’s also imagine that this law meets Professor Lon Fuller’s (1902–
1978) eight canons of law such that we would agree that there is an
internal morality of the law.245 In other words, the law (1) is one of
general application; (2) is published in the Federal Register and in
the U.S. Code; (3) has statutory language that is clear, precise, and
comprehensible so that people readily understand their legal rights
and obligations; (4) does not contradict itself or any other U.S. law;
(5) can be readily complied with; (6) is stable and cannot be changed
without an act of Congress; (7) is not applied retroactively; and (8)
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See MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 166; Fundamental Legal
Conceptions, supra note 208, at 710.
241
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1969).

618

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:565

is administered and enforced as written.246 Let’s further suppose that
the law conforms to that legal system’s basic norm under the Pure
Theory of Law posited by Hans Kelsen (1881–1973),247 or is consistent with that legal system’s rule of recognition, as Hart would
say;248 in this case, the law was challenged, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has upheld that law as constitutional.
Even under these circumstances—where a law meets all the criteria of Fuller’s internal morality,249 where the law conforms to Kelsen’s basic norm,250 and where that law is validly promulgated under
that legal system’s secondary rules and rules of recognition—such a
law may still be morally repugnant. Think of the Fugitive Slave
Acts.251 Think of “separate but equal.”252
Once again, there are easy and hard cases on the question of
whether a positive law is so morally repugnant that perhaps it is not
a law at all, or perhaps it is a law and should simply not be obeyed.253
The Fugitive Slave Act is an easy case for twenty-first century
Americans—at least on the question whether that law is morally repugnant.254 But what about at-will employment, gender stereotyping, and outsourcing? My guess is that many would call these easy
cases as well—easy because, in their view, these cases are not morally repugnant even if we might prefer a different solution. I do not
246

See id. at 39; see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
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Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of an 1890 Louisiana state law providing for segregated, separate but equal,
railroad accommodations).
253
See, e.g., id.
254
See 1 Stat. 302; 9 Stat. 462.

2017]

WORKERS' RIGHTS AS NATURAL HUMAN RIGHTS

619

share this view. For reasons discussed in Section V, these cases are
at best morally ambiguous.
C. Are Human Rights Simply the Sum of Human Plus Rights or Is
the Sum Greater than the Whole?
The definition provided above tells us that human rights are
claim rights that humans possess because they are human.255 This
definition is very formulistic and does not account for several possibilities, two of which I examine. First, might human rights simply
be a term of art, such that when put together the sum is greater than
its parts.256 Second, the term does not account for other types of
rights such as privileges, powers, and immunities.257 While this is
true, these other categories are not relevant. Powers and immunities,
for example, are secondary rights258 that merely reveal whether the
rights holder, A, has the power to alter B’s rights. If A has that right,
we say that it has power. If A does not have that right, we say that
B holds an immunity.259
The first possibility—that the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts—is a more difficult question, which I attempt to answer in
the next section. For the remainder of this Article, I challenge the
view that the U.S. work law status quo is morally acceptable. To do
this, I need to get to the foundational level of work law. I have already begun this analysis by deconstructing what it means to possess
rights. I now proceed to deconstruct what it means for workers to
possess natural human rights independent of the positive law.
V. FINDING NATURAL LAW THROUGH EMPATHY IN THE ORIGINAL
POSITION
Our tale of two cities recounts a world in which we can assess a
legal system’s record on human rights against two different types of
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See MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 166; see also Fundamental
Legal Conceptions, supra note 208, at 710, 716–17.
256
See What are Human Rights?, supra note 131.
257
See generally HART, supra note 241, at 79.
258
See id.
259
See Some Fundamental Conceptions, supra note 208, at 30; HART, supra
note 241, at 78–79.
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standards: (1) positive law, for example, well-established, international law principles; or (2) natural law, laws cognizable through
reason and derived from human nature, which would universally apply to all humans. We can readily determine the positive law.260 The
question is, what is the source of the natural law?261 The work of
Professor John Rawls might provide guidance.262
A. Rawls’s Theory of Justice Promises a Well-ordered Just Society
Governed by Two Principles: Equality in the Assignment of Basic
Rights/Duties and Socio-Economic Inequalities Permitted Only if
They Do Not Make the WORM Worse Off
In A Theory of Justice, Professor Rawls is concerned with establishing principles of justice in a well-ordered, nearly just, pluralist
society peppered with inequality.263 Rawls understood that such societies are ordered, at least in part, by laws and that “laws . . . no
matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.”264 The question Rawls presents is: How do
we determine the principles by which society might be justly ordered?265 Answering this question is a particularly difficult task if,
as Rawls observed, “[t]he justice of a social scheme depends essentially on how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the
economic opportunities and social conditions in the various sectors
of society.”266
To answer his question, Professor Rawls posits a thought experiment where we are asked to imagine individuals in an “original position of equality” in which none of the actors in this “hypothetical
situation . . . .knows his place in society, his class position or social
status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”267 In
this original position, the parties are asked to choose “principles of
justice” to govern their society “behind a veil of ignorance.”268
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268

For a comparison with the positive law, see infra Section VI.
See KANT, supra note 190, at 38–57
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1999).
See id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
Id.
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Rawls was concerned with the problems of inequalities based on
factors other than merit:
The intuitive notion here is that . . . [people] born into
different positions have different expectations of life
determined, in part, by the political system as well as
by economic and social circumstances . . . .[T]he institutions of society favor certain starting places over
others. These are especially deep inequalities. Not
only are they pervasive, but they affect [the individual’s] initial chances in life; yet they cannot possibly
be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or
desert. It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable
in the basic structure of any society, to which the
principles of social justice must in the first instance
apply.”269
John Rawls understood this truth: Starting points matter!270
According to Rawls, those in the original position would choose
the following two principles, famously known as the liberty and the
difference principles:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible
with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. 271
Simply put, Rawls argues that those in the original position
would choose a world where all people have equal access to the
basic liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of association,

269

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
See id. at 7. For an excellent analysis on the point that starting points matter, see C. Edwin Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8
HOFSTRA. L. REV. 939, 940–48 (1980).
271
RAWLS, supra note 262, at 53.
270
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freedom of religious exercise, among others; and where any distribution or redistribution of wealth benefits all.272
B. A Thought Experiment: The Veil of Empathy
Now imagine individuals in a different “original position of
equality” in which all of the actors in this “hypothetical situation”
can experience every person’s “place in society, . . . class position
or social status, . . . fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, [] intelligence, strength, and the like.”273 In this position,
the participants would still be under a veil of ignorance (that is, they
would know nothing about who they are), but they would be able to
walk in the shoes of every individual. Such a person would be able
to empathize with every person.274
Empathic participants behind a veil of ignorance would likely
develop a theory of workplace justice where rules reflect autonomy
and dignity, while minimizing employer coercion. What that workplace might look like is described in the following section. 275
The most common objection I have received to this thought experiment is that the use of empathy, instead of ignorance, strengthens the objection to Rawls’ original thought experiment. Namely,
humans cannot even imagine what it is like to be under a veil of
ignorance, let alone under a veil of empathy.276 I am bothered by
neither objection. In my several years teaching jurisprudence, I have
met only two students who have claimed that they cannot imagine
what it is like to be under the veil of ignorance. Every other student
has felt that, with time and imagination, they can situate themselves
under the veil of ignorance. The veil of empathy should be even easier as the following anecdote illustrates. When I was 11 years old, I
earned a spot on my high school’s junior varsity diving team. Our
best diver was a 17-year-old young black woman, who was a county
and state diving champion. I watched her in awe as she sailed
272

See id.
Id. at 11.
274
A full discussion of what constitutes empathy is beyond the scope of this
Article but will be developed in a future article. For an excellent treatment of
empathy, see Andrea McArdle, Using a Narrative Lens to Understand Empathy
and How it Matters in Judging, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 173, 176 (2012).
275
See infra Part VI.
276
See generally RAWLS, supra note 262, at 11.
273
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through the air in perfect form and entered the water without a
splash. One evening I had a dream that I was the best diver in the
state. The only catch? I had to become black. I spent the next few
days (in my dream) walking around as a black version of myself.
My “friends” picked on me; told me that I was stupid; and bullied
me in numerous ways. In the end, I chose to be myself—white and
mediocre. In that dream, at the ripe old age of 11, I recognized that
the world was unjust; that it was more unjust to black girls than to
white girls; and that I was more comfortable being an invisible white
girl than drawing attention to myself by being a talented athlete
cloaked in black skin. I dreamt what it was like to be a black girl.
Perhaps, as a blonde, blue-eyed, pale-skinned little girl, I could not
completely feel the pain of racial discrimination, but I did come
close to a type of empathy, without much effort.
It is by now well-established that affective instruction, using
emotions to reinforce learning, is an important objective of early education.277 Indeed, empathy can be defined as “an affective response
more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own.”278 The veil
of empathy is designed to capture this intuition.
VI. LEGITIMIZING THE WORKPLACE: BUILDING A JUST WORKPLACE
ON FOUNDATIONAL VALUES
A. Workers’ Rights as Human Rights279
1. THE NATURE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
AUTONOMOUS DIGNIFIED WORKER
In Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, I argue that there are two foundational
277

See generally ROBERT COLES, THE MORAL INTELLIGENCE OF CHILDREN:
HOW TO RAISE A MORAL CHILD 87–88 (1997); DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE THAN IQ (1995).
278
See MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING AND JUSTICE 4 (2000).
279
The human rights literature is vast. There is disagreement within this literature as to the nature of human rights and the significance or priority of those
rights as relative to one another as well as to other positive rights within a particular sovereign’s legal system. It is not my intention here to answer those questions
in a comprehensive manner. I wish instead to focus on the idea of workers’ rights
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values for establishing a just workplace: autonomy and dignity,
hence the name, the autonomous dignified worker.280 Borrowing
heavily from Professor Raz’s definition of personal autonomy, I define worker autonomy as follows: “[t]he autonomous [worker] is a
(part) author of [his or her work] life . . . .controlling, to some degree, [his or her] own destiny . . . through successive decisions
throughout [his or her life].”281 For Raz, “[a]utonomy is opposed to
a life of coerced choices[.]”282
Similarly, worker autonomy is opposed to unilateral decisions
made by the employer and imposed on the worker, especially when
the decisions affect the workers’ wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.283 It “contrasts with a [work] life of no
choices, or . . . without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose.”284
To be autonomous, the following conditions must be met: (1) the
worker must possess “the mental ability to identify work life influences”; (2) the worker must have “access to information sufficient
to generate a range of options”; (3) the worker must be free from
coercion; and (4) the worker must have access to “modes of participation that empower [him or her] to effect changes in” his or her
work life.285 Mental capacity, information, independence, and participation are the bare minimum workplace conditions that must be
met for workers to possess some degree of autonomy in the workplace.286
The other foundational value for establishing a just workplace is
dignity.287 In The Autonomous Dignified Worker, I define dignity as

as human rights. What is the nature of those rights? What is the source of those
rights? The question of what significance or priority a legitimate political system
should give to workers’ rights is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally
Anne Marie Lofaso, Civil Disobedience: Peaceful Solutions to Attaining Autonomy and Human Dignity at Work (working paper) (on file with author) [hereinafter Civil Disobedience].
280
Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 3.
281
Id. at 39 (quoting MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 369).
282
MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 371.
283
Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); see also N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1958).
284
MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 371.
285
Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 40 (citations omitted).
286
See id.
287
See id. at 49.
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follows: “The ruling idea behind the ideal of dignity is that individual members of a community should treat each and every other
member of that community as persons of independent moral
worth.”288
I further note that “[a]s a right enforceable against the state, dignity signifies in part that ‘individuals have a right to equal concern
and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern them.’”289 Moreover, “[a]s a right enforceable
against other institutions, such as employers or even unions, dignity
demands that these institutions, created for the benefit of natural
persons, treat their beneficiaries with equal concern and respect.”290
Kant’s categorical imperative provides a more rigorous foundation on which to build a just and dignified workplace.291 As explained above in Section IV.B.1., the categorical imperative—understood as a moral imperative, which commands us to act as if we
are legal officials in a universal law-making body that always treats
humans as ends and never merely as means—becomes a solid foundation for a natural law conception of a human-rights platform for
workers based on dignity.292 This principle essentially allows employers to employ human persons to work for them, but prohibits
employers from treating those human workers merely as a means of
making money.293 Instead, employers must consider the good of
those humans who work for their firms.294
There are at least three other values that labor advocates often
advance as foundational values for the workplace—participation,
democracy, and justice. By participation, I mean the meaningful opportunity to participate in decisions affecting one’s work life. Such
participation could be accomplished through unions, works councils, quality circles, or through significant Board-level participation
by workers. In general, I am referring to the voice function of these
institutions. By democracy, I intend the meaningful opportunity to
have equal say in such decisions. I am not only thinking of the one288
289
290
291
292
293
294

Id. (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 181 (1977)).
Id. (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 288, at 180).
Id. (emphasis added).
See KANT, supra note 190, at 38–57.
See id. at 46–47, 56–57.
See id.
See id.
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person-one-vote concept in union elections. I am also thinking of
participation in other voice institutions where the workers’ diverse
voices are not diluted by the employer’s voice or the voices of other
parties. For example, Board-level participation might also be characterized as a democratic right, so long as the workers’ voice is not
diluted by shareholder representatives. It is thus readily observed
that participation and democracy are closely related. By justice, I
don’t simply mean due process in disciplinary hearings—although
that is an important component of a just workplace. I also mean the
creation of a workplace where the fruits of one’s labor are fairly distributed.
Given how I have defined these terms, autonomy and dignity
are, in my view, foundational and the three other values can be derived from autonomy and dignity. In other words, participation, democracy, and justice are desirable but not foundational values. I will
not, however, prove that in this Article. Instead, to avoid argument
with those who champion other values as foundational, I will proceed on the assumption that all five values are desirable for building
a workplace grounded in human rights, leaving the meta-question
for another day.
2. THE LEGAL SOURCE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
As Professor James Gross correctly noted, “[t]he concept of human rights . . . has not been an important influence in the making of
United States labor policy.”295 Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court early on
recognized that workers’ rights secured under the National Labor
Relations Act are “fundamental,” stating:
[T]he [NLRA] . . . safeguard[s] the right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives
of their own choosing for collective bargaining or
other mutual protection without restraint or coercion
by their employer.
That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear
a right to organize and select their representatives for
lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its
295

James A. Gross, Worker Rights as Human Rights: Wagner Act Values and
Moral Choices, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 479, 480 (2002).
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business and select its own officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise
of the right of employees to self-organization and
representation is a proper subject for condemnation
by competent legislative authority. Long ago we
stated the reason for labor organizations. We said
that they were organized out of the necessities of the
situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself
and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him
the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and
unfair treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their
employer.296
The keystone of those fundamental rights, posited in NLRA Section 7, is that employees possess “the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”297 Were this a human right, then the
source of that right, in my view, would not be positive legislative
law, which could be enacted or repealed at the whim of the majority,
but morality or some other source external to the positive law.
Accordingly, the practical import of the Court’s declaration that
Section 7 rights are “fundamental”298 is unclear. Perhaps the Court
meant that those rights are foundational, that is, grounded in some
value external to the positive law. Perhaps it meant that those rights
are positive rights grounded in the basic values embedded in our
Constitution, such as freedom of association.299 Or perhaps the
296
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (emphasis
added) (citing Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 209 (1921)).
297
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
298
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33.
299
See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV.
689, 697 (arguing that Section 7 essentially protects rights rooted in the first
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Court meant something else entirely. Unfortunately, the Court did
not explain what it meant.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s observation that workers’
freedom to associate for the purposes of collective bargaining and
mutual aid or protection is “fundamental,”300 the Court never analyzed the constitutionality of the NLRA with respect to the constitutional right to freedom of association.301 Instead, it based its analysis on the breadth of Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate commerce, including labor-management relations
where Congress had determined that an inequality of bargaining
power made illusory freedom of contract between certain forms of
business organization and individual employees, which in turn
caused economic disruptions to commerce.302 This analysis hardly
presents a moral foundation for the law of the workplace, unless
freedom to engage in economic activity is once again arrogated to
that level. That explanation is exceedingly unlikely in this context,
where the Court is disrupting the Lochner paradigm.303
What we are left with are two findings. One, that Section 7 rights
are fundamental. Two, that Congress has authority to enact laws to
protect those rights under the Commerce Clause. The first lends
moral legitimacy to the NLRA’s purpose; the second lends positive
legitimacy.
My point—that the validity of some laws and their basic foundations reside in morality—is not without controversy. Indeed,
many of the greatest legal philosophers of the twentieth century, including Professors Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Joseph Raz are
positivists who reject the argument that the law’s validity is based
on a morality that is extrinsic to the law itself.304 So let me make a
amendment and thus that “[c]ongress brought the first amendment to private employment”).
300
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33.
301
See generally James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1072–78, 1089–91, 1131
(1987).
302
See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 29–33.
303
See supra Section II.A.
304
See generally HART, supra note 241, at 227–29; KELSEN, supra note 247,
at 1, 59–69; Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence,
55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 44, 66–70 (1941); MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208,
193–216.
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thin version of this argument: even if the law is positive in nature, I
am interested in what the law should be and therefore seek to find
values to ground labor laws. In the thick version, I claim that only
those labor laws that reflect these values are legitimate because only
those labor laws are morally grounded by legitimate values. The
trick is to find the legitimizing values. Are they autonomy, dignity,
participation, democracy, and justice or are there some other values
that should govern the workplace?
I acknowledge that the legitimating source of the law will result
in different policy consequences. Indeed, even the thin and thick
versions of my argument will result in different policy consequences. For example, if Section 7 is legitimate only if it promotes
the autonomous dignified worker then administrative and judicial
constructions of Section 7 must promote those values. By contrast,
if Section 7 is legitimate if it promotes values underlying the Commerce Clause then administrative and judicial constructions are
much more likely to take into consideration the value of industrial
peace to prevent obstructions to commerce. To tie a bow on this
point, I would also have to articulate the consequences of breaking
legitimate laws. Are citizens morally permitted to break laws not
grounded in legitimate values? If so, what form of civil disobedience
is permissible? By contrast, if such laws are grounded in illegitimate
values, are they even laws? These questions are not answered
here.305
B. The Rights-Based Workplace Model from the Workers’ Interests
1. OVERVIEW
In this section, I construct a rights-based model of the workplace
derived from workers’ interests. To do this, I must, as a threshold
matter, identify the claim-rights holders, in this case the workers;
and the duty holders. For purposes of this paper, let’s assume that
workers can claim duties from the following stakeholders: (1) employers; (2) owners of the factors of production; (3) businesses as
artificial persons; (4) managers, supervisors, and other agents of the
305

See generally Civil Disobedience, supra note 279 (paper presented at the
Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution’s Symposium: The Role of ADR Mechanisms in Public Sector Labor Disputes: What Is at Stake, Where We Can Improve & How We Can Learn from the Private Sector (Feb. 17, 2012)).
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employers, owners, and businesses; and (5) the government (and its
agents), in cases where the workers are public employees. When
talking about this duty-holder in a generic matter, I will often use
the shorthand term, employer. Next, assuming that rights are based
on interests and are grounded in values, I must identify the interests
and foundational values of the opposing parties. I have already identified the desirable/foundational values of workers—autonomy, dignity, participation, democracy, and justice. I accomplish the remaining tasks in Section V.B.2, infra, where I also show the extent to
which those interests are in conflict. I end this section by generating
a rights-based workplace model.
2. IDENTIFYING THE INTERESTS OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS AND
THE VALUES REFLECTED IN THOSE INTERESTS
As Congress identified in the NLRA, workers have interests in
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”306
Using that statutory phrase as a starting point to better understand
workers’ interests, I examine the following concepts: job security,
wages and benefits, hours, working conditions and work location,
and training.
i. Job Security
Although job security is not specifically mentioned in the NLRA
as an employee interest, it is the threshold interest.307 Without a job,
the workers’ interest in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment is meaningless. Job security means different things
to different people in different cultures.308 As I have written elsewhere, a right to job security as a procedural matter enforceable
against the employer could range from at-will employment, which
carries no job security and no procedures for securing or maintaining
a job, to advance notice of job loss, to consultation over job loss, to
bargaining over the effects of that job loss to bargaining over the

306

29 U.S.C. §158(d) (2012).
See generally id.
308
See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, Talking Is Worthwhile: The Role of Employee Voice in Protecting, Enhancing, and Encouraging Individual Rights to Job
Security in a Collective System, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 55, 88–91 (2010)
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decision to terminate, to just-cause termination, to co-determination.309 The spectrum might look something like this:

A more substantive right to job security as enforceable against
the state or an employer might mean a right to a particular job or a
right to any job, but not a job of one’s choice.310 Recognizing, however, that neither governments nor employers can completely control the unemployment rate or rate of employment in a country, a
particular business sector such as the industrial or manufacturing
sectors, or even at a particular firm, a right to a job might have to be
liquidated.311 Accordingly, it may not mean a right to a job at all but
a right to income replacement in the likely event that the government
or the employer cannot sustain a promise of full employment.312 In
this case, the spectrum might look as follows:

ii. “Wages, Hours, and Other Terms and Conditions of
Employment”
Over the past 75 years, the Board, with court approval, has
fleshed out the statutory phrase “wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.”313 The NLRB has broadly construed the

309

See id. at 63, 68–69.
See id. at 66–67.
311
See id. at 62–63, 66 n.49, 73–75; see generally A.C.S., Structural Unemployment: Jobs for the Long Run, THE ECONOMIST (May 21, 2012, 9:01 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/05/structural-unemployment.
312
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statutory term “wages” to include across-the-board wage increases,314 merit increases,315 premium pay,316 commissions, bonuses,317 severance pay,318 and benefits. Benefits include, for example, pension plans,319 group health insurance plans,320 various fringe
benefits,321 and disability leave.322 The Board has also broadly construed the statutory term “hours,” stating:
[T]he particular hours of the day and the particular
days of the week during which employees shall be
required to work are subjects well within the realm
of ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment’ about which employers and unions
must bargain.323
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See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743–45 (1962).
See, e.g., J. H. Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377, 377–78 (1946), enforced,
165 F.2d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 1948).
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See, e.g., B.P. Oil, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 1107, 1111 (1981), enforced, 681
F.2d 804, 804 (3d Cir. 1982); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506,
1507–08 (1964) (differential shift pay); Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 141
N.L.R.B. 1154, 1160–64 (1963) (overtime pay).
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Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (profit-sharing retirement plans).
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modified on other grounds, 426 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Hours of work might include, for example, the number of hours
worked per day, per week, or per pay period;324 start, quit, and break
times;325 work schedules and work shifts.326
Other terms and conditions of employment range from the fundamental to the trivial. On a fundamental level, workers are interested in a workplace free from compulsory labor, free from child
labor, and free from discrimination.327 As discussed above, these
freedoms are so basic that the ILO has identified them as the fundamental rights, along with freedom of association.328 The next most
basic term or condition of employment would concern one’s position: the right to retain one’s current position,329 or the right not to
be transferred to a job with more onerous working conditions.330
Other vital terms and conditions of employment would also include
all health and safety issues,331 privacy issues, and process issues.332
Less vital, but of basic concern to modern workers, are issues surrounding work location. This not only addresses geographical preferences and commuting costs, but also such issues as flexiplace, telecommuting, work centers, and virtual workplaces.333 On the other
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See id. See also George P. Pilling & Son Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 650, 651, 659
(1939), enforced, 119 F.2d 32, 39 (3rd Cir. 1941) (unilaterally shortening hours).
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See, e.g., Beverly Cal. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 227 F.3d 817, 838 (7th Cir. 2000)
(break times); Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 286 N.L.R.B. 1233, 1239–40 (1987),
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(1946) (Saturday and Sunday work).
327
See supra Section IV.A.3.
328
See id.
329
See, e.g., Chambers Mfg. Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 721, 723–25 (1959) (job
classification—although General Counsel failed to sustain burden of showing that
employer unilaterally changed job classifications).
330
See Bonham Cotton Mills, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1235, 1236 (1958) (workload), enforced, 289 F.2d 903, 904 (5th Cir. 1961) (per curiam).
331
See, e.g., Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1989) (drug and
alcohol testing of current employees who required medical treatment for on-thejob injuries).
332
See generally Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employers, Employees, and Labor Organizations, 66 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1068–75 (2006).
333
See generally Alex Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor
Law in the Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 182–
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end of the spectrum are the relatively minor working conditions such
as the extent to which a worker may use the telephone or play the
radio during working time.334
iii. Training
The concept of training returns us to the idea of job security. As
explained above, governments are unlikely to be able to sustain a
promise of full employment.335 Especially in a capitalist society,
where capital is legally permitted to move around the country and
even outside the country, the market plays a prominent role in the
extent of employment and unemployment.336 Even in times of low
unemployment rates, there is always going to be some frictional unemployment—unemployment arising from market mismatch between workers and jobs, thereby resulting in a short period of time
during which a worker is transitioning from school to job, from
parenthood to job, or from job to job.337 There is also likely always
to be some structural unemployment—involuntary unemployment
arising primarily from mismatched labor supply and demand.338 In
effect, structural unemployment results from a lack of demand for
the labor available.339 Structural unemployment differs from frictional unemployment insofar as structural unemployment tends not
to be temporary and is much more difficult to address as a policy
matter.340 For example, the technological displacement of workers
results in structural unemployment, whereas the search time in between jobs results in frictional unemployment.341

86 (2011) (outlining the difficulties in the application of the NLRA to modern
working conditions).
334
See Hedison Mfg. Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 791, 796 (1980).
335
See generally Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 66–68.
336
See generally A.C.S., supra note 311.
337
See Tim Worstall, US Jobless Claims Fall to Lowest Rate Ever – At Least
Since Records Began, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/03/02/us-jobless-claims-fall-to-lowest-rate-ever-at-least-since-records-began/#4a5bf57d4a7d.
338
See A.C.S., supra note 311.
339
See id.
340
See id.
341
For a basic explanation of structural unemployment, see id.
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The following chart, taken from the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Bureau of Labor Statistics,342 depicts the difference in job openings
and unemployment rate in the U.S. over the past 16 years:

This chart tells us that between December 2007 and late 2009,
the U.S. was in a recession because the unemployment rate is high
and job openings rate is low.343 During a period of expansion the
converse would be true—low unemployment rate and high job
openings rate.344 By contrast, in 2010 and 2011, each month’s point
on the curved moved “up and to the left as the job openings rate

342

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, JOB OPENINGS AND
LABOR TURNOVER SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS 4 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/web/jolts
/jlt_labstatgraphs.pdf.
343
See id.
344
Id.
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increased and the unemployment rate decreased.”345 This indicates
an expanding economy during that time.
The Beveridge Curve gives us insights into workers’ basic interest in job security.346 Hypothetical rational workers will understand
that their jobs may not always be available in a capitalist economy.347 Accordingly, it is in their interest to receive broad training
so that they can more readily find work during periods of contraction.
iv. Other Interests: The Search for Meaningful Work
Workers’ have many more interests. I think of these as the search
for meaningful work. Those interests range from receiving tasks to
keep busy to creating a social outlet to performing assignments that
links work to personal identity.348
3. COMPARING WORKERS’ INTERESTS WITH EMPLOYERS’
INTERESTS
As explained above, workers have several interests. Broadly
speaking, we could characterize those interests as follows: job security,349 living wages, good benefits, choice hours, work location
flexibility, good working conditions, and generalized training. Table
1 below shows how these interests conflict fundamentally with employers’ interests:
Table 1. Comparison of Worker and Management Interests
Labor
Management
1. Job security
1. Employment at-will
2. Living wages & good bene- 2. Low costs/Profit maximizafits
tion/ High production/Efficient
production
3. Choice hours and work lo- 3. Property preservation/Monication
tor employees for shirking
345
346
347
348
349

Id.
See id.; see also A.C.S., supra note 311.
See generally Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 62–63, 66–68.
See generally Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 39-40.
See Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 58.
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4. Minimize liability
5. Firm-specific training

This table shows us the extent to which workers and firms have
diametrically opposed interests. For example, whereas workers want
job security, employers favor employment at-will at least in part to
lower the cost of terminating employment.350 According to Professor Richard Epstein, the at-will employment doctrine should be
maintained not only as a permissible contractual term, but also “as
a rule of construction in response to the perennial question of gaps
in contract language: what term should be implied in the absence of
explicit agreement on the question of duration or grounds for termination?”351 Epstein defends the at-will employment doctrine on both
human rights grounds—because it embodies “[f]reedom of contract
[a]s an aspect of individual liberty”352—and economic grounds—
because it “represents in most contexts the efficient solution to the
employment relation.”353
It turns out that efficiency is often at the heart of the managerial
interest.354 Employers prefer the at-will doctrine because it means
that it can more inexpensively breach the so-called employment
contract.355 Under the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency economic model, a
transaction is more efficient if the breaching party remains better off
after legally compensating the nonbreaching party.356

350

See Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 8.
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 UNIV. CHI. L.
REV. 947, 951 (1984).
352
Id. at 953.
353
Id. at 951.
354
See Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 8.
355
See id.
356
See id.
351
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4. COMPARING AND EVALUATING THE VALUES UNDERLYING
WORKERS’ AND EMPLOYERS’ INTERESTS
Recall the five basic values underlying workers’ interests:
1. Autonomy
 . . . to become part-author of one’s working
life.357
2. Dignity
 . . . to be treated as persons with independent
moral worth.358
3. Participation
 . . . to participate in decisions affecting one’s
work life.359
4. Democracy
 . . . to have an equal or substantial say in those
decisions.360
5. Justice
 . . . to work in a workplace where terminations are for cause and where the fruits of
one’s labor are fairly distributed.
i. Autonomy or Coercion? Participation or Unilateral Decisionmaking? Democracy or Disloyalty?
Whereas workers value their autonomy361—the capacity to become part-author of their work lives—employers do not value workers’ autonomy because, in their view, it interferes with the em-

357
358
359
360
361

See id. at 38–49.
See id.at 49.
See id. at 40–42.
See id.
See id. at 40–42.
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ployer’s autonomy to make unilateral decisions about the workplace.362 In other words, employers value coercion of their employees—employers wish to control their employees and force them to
behave in a certain manner without input for their workers.
Seeing this from a different vantage point, employers do not
value employee voice, for its own sake. To be sure, employers may
and often do value employee input—information solicited or received from their workers to help employers make decisions. Employers may also value worker reports—using workers as the employers’ “eyes and ears” to report misconduct or poor performance.
Employers are not concerned, necessarily, with how that input affects the worker’s autonomy or the worker’s voice. Along these
lines, employers are not willing to surrender what they believe is
theirs, the unilateral right to make production decisions, which by
definition includes decisions that affect the worker’s work life. The
reluctance to surrender that authority is, in this way, analogous to
the reluctance of the king to surrender his decision-making authority
to his subjects in the form of parliament, which incidentally derives
from the Latin word, parlar, meaning to speak. It takes only a small
additional step to see how asking for a voice in decision-making
might be viewed as disloyalty to the firm or to the king.
ii. Dignity or Factor of Production?
Whereas workers want to be treated with the dignity that every
person deserves merely for being human, firms treat workers as factors of production.363 This treatment, by definition, handles workers
as instruments or means rather than ends in themselves. While common in economic analysis, managing workers as mere factors of
production removes the humanity from workers, thereby dehumanizing them.364

362

See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 23 (1915).
See Walter Y. Oi, Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor, 70 J. OF POL. ECON. 538,
539 (1962).
364
See Bekah Mandell, Putting Theory into Practice: Using a Human Rights
Framework and Grassroots Organizing to Build a National Revolutionary Movement, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 402, 407 (2012).
363

640

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:565

iii. Justice or Efficiency/Productivity/Wealth Maximization?
Workers want both procedural and substantive justice.365 For example, in the case of a discharge, they want to know that they will
be treated fairly.366 They also want to know that the fruits of their
labor are distributed fairly.367 This desire is at odds with the employers’ desire to maximize profits, which means cutting costs and/or
increasing revenues.368 Firms can cut costs by lowering wages, laying off workers, denying benefits, cutting hours—all actions that
would negatively impact employees.369 Firms can also increase revenues by increasing productivity.370 Productivity gains might be realized through mechanization, which means labor layoffs, or it could
be accomplished by making labor work harder. These are all means
by which employers and employees essentially fight over the distribution of the wealth that they have jointly created. Table 2. summarizes this discussion:
Table 2. Values at Odds
Union
Autonomy
Dignity
Participation
Democracy
Justice

Management
Coercion
Labor – a factor of production
Unilateral decision-making
Loyalty to the firm
Efficiency/Productivity/Wealth
Maximization

Notwithstanding these conflicts, there is one interest that both
parties have in common—that is, the firm’s financial well-being.371
Workers’ value the firm’s financial well-being because the firm is
365

See generally Robert C. Dailey & Delaney J. Kirk, Distributive and Procedural Justice as Antecedents of Job Dissatisfaction and Intent to Turnover, 45
HUM. REL. 305, 307–08 (1992).
366
See id.
367
See id.
368
See Truman F. Bewley, Why Not Cut Pay?, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 459, 478–
79 (1998).
369
See id.
370
See generally George N. Root III, Factors to Increase Productivity,
CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/factors-improve-productivity-1229.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
371
See generally Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 74.
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their source of job security and income. Employers value it because
the firm is their source of profit and wealth. The parties disagree on
one fundamental point, however; how the wealth, which is the product of labor and capital working together, should be distributed.372
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Summary
In the context of an increasingly polarized U.S. electorate, there
has been a backlash against workplace regulations that had previously raised the floor of rights upon which workers engage. Clever
employers have ascertained how to evade work regulations by asking courts, administrative agencies, and legislative bodies to narrow
the definitions of employee and employer. This current trend toward
workplace fragmentation, which is not limited to the U.S. but which
has also infected other legal systems such as that of the European
Union, often comes in the form of outsourcing even core jobs resulting in legal problems for fringe workers (e.g., part-time workers,
independent contractors). For example, workers who are independent contractors are not statutory employees under the NLRA and
therefore are not protected for purposes of that law regardless of the
economic realities of the employer-employee relationship or the
economic realities that make them dependent on “their” employers.
This legal landscape has resulted in a workforce in which many
workers are no longer tied to a particular employer. These individuals have consequently lost their statutory and other legal protections
simply because they do not fit the regulatory or common law definition of employee. In effect, there is no employer on which to place
a legal duty to protect.
In this Article, I argue that a human rights approach to work regulations could remedy this problem. If workers’ rights no longer depended on workers’ status as employees of a particular employer,
but instead attached to workers simply because they engaged in
work, this could place a duty on the state to ensure that someone is
a duty holder—most likely, the business that benefits from their
work, the state, or a third-party beneficiary. In such circumstances,
372

See generally Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 25–26.
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a human rights approach to workers’ rights would remedy the noduty-holder problem. I call this concept “the worker as citizen.
In this Article, I have taken a six-step analytical approach to analyze the question whether a human rights approach would help
solve some of these problems (in particular, the no-duty-holder
problem373) and what a human rights approach might look like. In
step one,374 I took a historical approach to understanding the labor
law model that is dominant in the U.S.—a model that is filtered
through a free market economic ideology. Although the New Deal
Keynesian economic model temporarily disrupted this model, the
free market has now returned in the form of neo-liberal law and economics. The clash of these two world views is, as Joseph Stiglitz has
written, “the nightmare towards which we are slowly marching.”375
In step two,376 I explored T.H. Marshall’s concept of citizenship.
An account of labor law where the worker is essentially a full citizen
regardless of his or her legal status (e.g., statutory employee, independent contractor, migrant worker) helps combat the no-dutyholder problem (identified above). Using Marshall’s framework to
explain that full citizens possess political, civil, and social rights, I
point out that workers’ rights do not fit neatly into Marshall’s rubric
not only because they are socio-economic rights, but also because
they cut across these and other categories. I conclude that Marshall’s
model is only a partial solution, albeit a step in the right direction.
In step three,377 building on Marshall’s rubric, I created a framework for evaluating workplace laws based on the worker as a citizen
of the labor force who has human rights. I do this using two methodologies: comparative legal analysis and jurisprudential analysis.
First, I describe international labor standards, as articulated in basic
human rights instruments, and compare them to fundamental U.S.
laws. I conclude that U.S. laws fare well in such a comparison, at
least at a superficial level. This analysis is essentially a comparison
between the positive international law and the positive national law.
Second, I deconstruct the terms “human” and “rights.”378 Drawing
373
374
375
376
377
378

See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.
See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 289.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.B.
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primarily on the philosophical theories of Immanual Kant (dignity),
Ronald Dworkin (dignity), and Raz (autonomy), and also the rights
theories of Joseph Raz and Wesley Hohfeld (that rights are based on
interests and grounded in values), I draw two conclusions. First, human rights must be grounded in at least two values—autonomy and
dignity. Second, human rights are greater than adding what makes
us human together with what makes a right.
In step four,379 I modify Rawls’s famous thought experiment to
show that a workplace grounded in autonomy and dignity is a just
model. In this modified original position, which I call the empathic
position, the participants remain ignorant about their own particular
characteristics, but could and would be able to know what it would
be like to live the life of every type of person —every race, ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation, and class—to name but a few characteristics. Accordingly, those in the modified original position could
empathize with all. Using a veil of empathy rather than the veil of
ignorance as the defining feature of those in the original position
helps move forward the conversation regarding workers’ rights because it forces us to account for all viewpoints when making policy
choices.
While this paper centers on the autonomous dignified worker, it
also adopts a theoretical framework that is sensitive to power: the
relative power of labor and capital, and the relative power of government and capital. Such a framework, with a focus on collectives
and institutions, supplements the somewhat liberal individualist values of autonomy and dignity. Recognizing this dynamic, I created a
fifth step,380 where I apply this human rights framework to the workplace to show that employers’ and employees’ interests conflict at
the foundational level. Accordingly, employers and employees
struggle within this power-relationship. In the political arena, the resulting conflict leads to gridlock between those who believe that
promoting employers’ interests will result in the more liberated, and
therefore better, society, and those who believe that promoting
workers’ interests will create a more just, and therefore better, society. I show that the point of greatest conflict is not on the financial
well-being of the firm (in which both labor and management/owners
have an interest), but on how the wealth created by labor and capital
379
380

See supra Part V.
See supra Part VI.
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working together should be distributed. Accordingly, in a society
governed by free market principles, employers are incentivized to
diminish their duties to workers arising in part out of their own selfish interests. Firms are simply not internally motivated to consider
the positions of others. The law, or at least something external to the
firms’ economic interests, must incentivize firms to view their workers not merely as factors of production, but as human beings. Modern western democracies based on liberal principles and grounded
in libertarian economic theory are more likely to create grave injustices for those who possess neither economic nor political power.
The empathic position resets these tendencies, showing what kind
of society we should try to construct, with regard to everyone’s interests.
B. Final Thoughts
This paper leaves open several questions. First, to what extent,
if any, must the sovereign ground the workplace in worker autonomy and dignity to be legitimate? Second, to what extent, if any,
may workers engage in civil disobedience to protest illegitimate
work rules? Third, what is the relationship between the positiveright standard and the natural-right used for comparing and assessing U.S. labor laws?
All three questions are related and relate to one of my future research projects. In my view, if workplaces are governed by rules that
drift too far from significant values, then those workplaces are illegitimate. In such cases, workers are entitled to break such rules, in
much the same way that the civil disobedient is entitled to break
laws to protest unjust law and to communicate those views to the
public. The trick here is to understand the relationship between those
rules (positive law) and what might be natural laws grounded in
workplace values. Those in the modified original position will generate those natural values as autonomy, dignity, participation, democracy and justice and thus harmonize the City of God with the
City of man.381 Just how that will happen is the subject of my next
article on this subject.
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